Servotronics, Inc. v. The Boeing Company, 954 F.3d 209

Background

Servotronics supplied a metering valve that was installed in a Rolls‑Royce engine on a Boeing 787; during testing in South Carolina the engine caught fire.
Rolls‑Royce settled Boeing’s damage claim and then demanded $12.8 million indemnity from Servotronics, which rejected the demand.
The parties’ Long Term Agreement required disputes to be resolved by arbitration in Birmingham, England under Chartered Institute of Arbitrators rules; Rolls‑Royce commenced that arbitration.
Servotronics filed a § 1782(a) application in the U.S. District Court to subpoena three South Carolina‑based Boeing employees for testimony to be used in the UK arbitration.
The district court denied the § 1782 application, relying on Second and Fifth Circuit precedents holding private arbitrations are not "tribunals" under § 1782.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding the UK arbitral panel qualifies as a "foreign or international tribunal" under § 1782 and remanded for the district court to exercise its discretion on the subpoena requests.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a private foreign arbitral panel is a "foreign or international tribunal" under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)	Intel supports a broad reading of "tribunal" that includes private arbitral tribunals; no requirement of public/state actor	"Tribunal" is limited to entities exercising government‑conferred authority; private arbitration excluded	The Fourth Circuit held the UK arbitral panel is a "foreign or international tribunal" under § 1782(a)
Whether Intel overruled or undercuts Bear Stearns and Biedermann	Intel’s reasoning undermines the narrow readings in those cases and permits § 1782 relief for arbitration	Intel did not overturn those precedents; they remain applicable	Court concluded Intel supports a broader approach and, in any event, UK arbitration meets even the narrower state‑authority test
Whether applying § 1782 to foreign arbitration would improperly expand discovery and conflict with the FAA	§ 1782 is limited, discretionary, and serves as judicial assistance—not automatic full discovery; district courts control scope	Applying § 1782 would allow broader discovery than the FAA contemplates, undermining arbitration policy	Court rejected the conflict argument, explaining § 1782 is discretionary and limited and district courts can manage burdens
Whether appellate court should issue subpoenas itself or remand for district court discretion	Servotronics asked the court to order the subpoenas	Boeing urged deference to the district court	Court remanded for the district court to exercise its § 1782 discretion and did not order subpoenas itself

Key Cases Cited

Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004) (§ 1782 authorizes discretionary federal‑court assistance to foreign tribunals and endorsed a broad, flexible reading of "tribunal")
Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999) (held private arbitral bodies are not "tribunals" under § 1782)
Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999) (similar holding excluding private arbitration from § 1782)
In re Application to Obtain Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, 939 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2019) (held § 1782 includes private commercial arbitral panels; created circuit split)
Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2015) (appellate courts generally defer to district courts on § 1782 discretionary factors)
Khrapunov v. Prosyankin, 931 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2019) (district courts best positioned to evaluate § 1782 requests and exercise discretion)