3:19-cv-01473
D. Conn.Dec 9, 2020Background
- Plaintiffs Servidio Landscaping, John Servidio and Rosanna Servidio own a parcel at 796–800 Cove Road in Stamford (C‑N zone) and operate landscaping/contracting services.
- Stamford (through zoning officials, including Lunney) issued multiple cease‑and‑desist letters and zoning enforcement actions; the city filed a state court action resolved by a March 21, 2018 Stipulation for Judgment but later moved for contempt (denied after evidentiary hearing).
- After the contempt denial, Plaintiffs allege continued selective enforcement, repeated violation letters, permit/ licensing denials, and city employees discouraging Plaintiffs’ customers—conduct they claim was motivated by personal animus and caused economic harm.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process Clauses, and asserted a state‑law claim for tortious interference with business expectancies.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) arguing Plaintiffs failed to plead a comparator for Equal Protection, failed to plead conscience‑shocking conduct for Substantive Due Process and lacked personal involvement allegations as to several individual defendants; also argued immunity and insufficiency on the state claim.
- The district court granted the motion as to the federal claims with prejudice (dismissing Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process), dismissed claims against several individual defendants for lack of personal involvement, and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state‑law claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Protection (selective enforcement) | Plaintiffs: Stamford selectively enforced zoning and permits against them due to malice/personal animus | Defendants: Complaint fails to identify any similarly situated comparator treated differently | Dismissed for failure to plead a specific comparator; leave to amend denied |
| Substantive Due Process (deprivation of property use) | Plaintiffs: Continued cease‑and‑desist orders and permitting refusals deprived them of protected property interests | Defendants: Actions were not conscience‑shocking; claim overlaps with Equal Protection | Dismissed—allegations do not show the outrageously arbitrary or gross abuse required for substantive due process |
| Personal involvement of individual defendants | Plaintiffs: All named defendants acted in concert in enforcement and permitting decisions | Defendants: No specific factual allegations showing each individual’s personal conduct | Dismissed as to Blessing, Martin, Patterson, Figueroa, Zelinsky for lack of personal involvement allegations |
| State claim (tortious interference) | Plaintiffs: City’s conduct interfered with business expectancies and customer relationships | Defendants: Immunity and failure to plead intentional interference | Court declined supplemental jurisdiction after dismissing federal claims; state claim not adjudicated on merits |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard: courts accept well‑pleaded facts but not legal conclusions)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.) (distinguishes LeClair malice‑based selective enforcement from Olech class‑of‑one and explains comparator standards)
- LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.) (articulates malice‑based selective enforcement test)
- Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (class‑of‑one equal protection theory)
- Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363 (2d Cir.) (substantive due process requires conscience‑shocking government action)
- Natale v. Town of Ridgefield, 170 F.3d 258 (2d Cir.) (limits substantive due process in zoning disputes; ordinary errors are for state court review)
- Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55 (2d Cir.) (plaintiff must plead factual content to allow inference of differential treatment)
- Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.) (personal involvement requirement for § 1983 liability)