Service Employees International Union v. The Illinois Labor Relations Board
2017 IL App (4th) 160347
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- The Union sought to include Executive I and II, Drivers Facility Manager I (DFM I), and DFM II employees of the Illinois Secretary of State in a bargaining unit; the ILRB initially certified inclusion for Executive titles before the legislature amended the Labor Act.
- The legislature amended 5 ILCS 315/3(n) to exclude from "public employee" (for Secretary of State employees) (1) those holding Executive I or higher, (2) those whose positions "authorize... meaningful input into government decision‑making on issues where there is room for principled disagreement," or (3) those otherwise exempt under the Secretary of State Merit Employment Code (effective April 5, 2013).
- The Secretary petitioned the Board to clarify that Executive I/II and DFM I/II positions are excluded from collective bargaining as of the amendment's effective date.
- Administrative proceedings focused on whether DFMs meet the second exclusion (the "meaningful input"/policymaking language); evidence showed DFMs supervise facilities, handle discipline, reconcile funds, authorize certain overtime, alter facility layout, and exercise discretion in resolving applicant issues.
- The ALJ recommended, and the Board adopted, a decision excluding Executive I/II (by title) and DFM I/II (by the policymaking/function test) from the Act's definition of "public employee." The appellate court reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and mixed questions for clear error and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Union) | Defendant's Argument (Secretary/Board) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper reading of 5 ILCS 315/3(n) — whether exclusion is two‑part (title + policymaker) or three independent clauses | The statute requires an employee to both hold Executive I or higher and meet one of the following "or" clauses; the second clause should be read only in conjunction with the title clause | The language is three independent exclusionary clauses: (1) Executive I or higher; (2) positions authorizing meaningful input; (3) Merit Code exemptions | Court: statute unambiguous; reads as three independent exclusionary clauses and adopts Board's interpretation |
| Whether Executive I and Executive II are excluded | Union: legislative amendment shouldn't automatically exclude similarly functioning non‑Executive titled positions; Executive exclusion should be limited to those with the classification title | Secretary: statutory text plainly excludes anyone holding the title Executive I or higher | Held: Exclusion by title is plain; Executive I and II are excluded without further factual inquiry |
| Whether DFM I and II authorize meaningful input into government decision‑making (i.e., meet the policymaking exclusion) | Union: DFMs are largely constrained by manuals, regional oversight, and limited disciplinary/overtime authority; thus not policymaking-level input | Secretary/Board: DFMs exercise facility‑level discretion (staffing, discipline initiation, overtime in some circumstances, handling unique applicant issues) and thus provide meaningful input with room for principled disagreement | Held: Substantial evidence supports that DFMs have meaningful input and discretion; Board's decision not clearly erroneous — DFMs excluded |
| Constitutional challenge (special legislation/equal protection) | Union: section 3(n) is special legislation or violates equal protection | Secretary/Board: issue not litigated below; no ruling reached | Held: Court finds issue waived for failure to obtain Board ruling; not considered on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981) (articulates functional "policymaker" test for meaningful input in political‑patronage contexts)
- AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380 (Ill. 2002) (standard for reviewing mixed questions of law and fact — "clearly erroneous")
- Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200 (Ill. 2008) (standard for reviewing factual findings — manifest weight)
- Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 212 Ill. 2d 237 (Ill. 2004) (statutory interpretation: give effect to legislature's intent and plain meaning)
- State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836 (Ill. 2013) (interpretive principle that different statutory language signals different legislative intent)