Service Employees International Union, Local 73 v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel
2017 IL App (4th) 160347
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- SEIU Local 73 sought inclusion of Executive I/II and Drivers Facility Manager (DFM) I/II employees of the Illinois Secretary of State in existing bargaining units; Board initially certified inclusion for Executives but the legislature amended the Labor Act effective April 5, 2013, creating exclusions in 5 ILCS 315/3(n).
- Following remand, the Secretary petitioned the Illinois Labor Relations Board (State Panel) to clarify that Executive I/II and DFM I/II positions are excluded from the Labor Act’s definition of "public employee."
- Administrative hearing: Executive I/II titles are expressly excluded by statute; the ALJ limited the hearing to whether DFM I/II meet the statute’s second exclusion (positions that "authorize meaningful input into government decision-making" where there is "room for principled disagreement").
- Testimony and position descriptions showed DFMs supervise facility staff, handle accounting, discipline, scheduling/overtime, discretionary decisions on applicant issues, alter facility layout, and contribute to procedures—exercising independent judgment and final authority within the facility.
- ALJ and Board found Executive I/II excluded by title and held DFM I/II also excluded under the statutory policymaking/management phrase; Union appealed, arguing statutory construction, misapplication of facts, and constitutional defects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper interpretation of 5 ILCS 315/3(n) (whether clause is conjunctive or lists three independent exclusions) | "Who holds Executive I or higher" must be read conjunctively with the policymaker language (i.e., title plus policymaking) | The statute lists three independent exclusionary clauses: (1) Executive I or higher; (2) positions authorizing meaningful input; (3) otherwise exempt under Merit Code | Court: statute unambiguous—three separate exclusion clauses; adopted Board’s reading |
| Whether Executive I and Executive II are excluded | Union: title alone should not automatically exclude employees without factual inquiry | Secretary: statutory text excludes anyone titled Executive I or higher | Held: exclusion is categorical by title; no factual inquiry required |
| Whether DFM I and DFM II are excluded under the "meaningful input / principled disagreement" clause | Union: DFMs do not have policymaking authority akin to Rutan/Nekolny standard and perform largely ministerial tasks | Secretary: DFMs exercise discretionary managerial authority (discipline, schedules/overtime, policy input, final local decisions) creating room for principled disagreement | Held: substantial evidence supports Board’s finding DFMs authorize meaningful input and are excluded; not clearly erroneous |
| Constitutionality / equal protection / special legislation challenge | Union: exclusion is arbitrary and violates equal protection and anti–special legislation principles because title/location distinctions are irrational | Secretary: statute valid; exclusions apply statewide and are justified by management/policy distinctions | Held: constitutional arguments waived or failed on merits; statute upheld as applied |
Key Cases Cited
- Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200 (review standard for agency factual findings)
- AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380 (standard for mixed questions of law and fact)
- Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir.) (formulation of the "policymaking"/Rutan test used as interpretive guidance)
- Harrisonville Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 212 Ill. 2d 237 (statutory interpretation—give words plain and ordinary meaning)
- People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237 (use ordinary meaning when statute is undefined)
- State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836 (different statutory language implies different legislative intent)