Sergio Mencia-Medina v. Merrick B. Garland, 6 F.4th 846

Background

Sergio Mencia-Medina, a Honduran national, entered the U.S. as a child in 2001 and was ordered removed in absentia that year.
He later lived with his parents, suffered childhood abuse and neglect, and his mother became a lawful permanent resident.
In Minnesota, he was convicted of making threats of violence arising from a 2016 incident.
In 2019 he moved to reopen the 2001 removal order, transferred venue to Minnesota, conceded removability, and applied for "special rule" cancellation of removal for children battered by LPR parents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2).
The immigration judge granted cancellation; DHS appealed and the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed, denying a favorable exercise of discretion.
Mencia-Medina petitioned for review in this court, raising (1) that the BIA engaged in impermissible factfinding, (2) the BIA applied the wrong legal standard for discretion, and (3) the BIA’s decision was internally inconsistent/unreasoned.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Mencia-Medina exhaust administrative remedies for his claim that the BIA engaged in impermissible factfinding?	Mencia-Medina argued the BIA exceeded its review scope by engaging in factfinding and supplanting IJ findings.	Government argued the exhaustion requirement applies and he did not raise this to the BIA via motion to reopen/reconsider.	Not exhausted; court lacks jurisdiction to consider the factfinding claim because he did not move the BIA to reopen/reconsider.
Did the BIA apply an incorrect legal standard by citing factors for § 1229b(a) rather than § 1229b(b)?	Mencia-Medina contended the BIA relied on In re C‑V‑T‑ (a §1229b(a) case) and should have applied §1229b(b)–specific factors (e.g., contextualized domestic abuse).	Government/Board maintained the BIA properly considered relevant favorable factors (including childhood abuse) and may reference §1229b(a) precedent for discretionary factors.	No legal error; citation of In re C‑V‑T‑ did not show misapplication because the BIA expressly considered abuse as a significant favorable factor.
Is the BIA’s denial of relief unreviewable because it was internally inconsistent after assuming eligibility?	Mencia-Medina argued that by assuming eligibility (good moral character) the BIA could not reasonably deny discretionary relief, making its decision unreasoned.	Government argued eligibility and discretionary grant are analytically distinct; discretionary denials are unreviewable and the BIA cited negative factors outweighing positives.	Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over discretionary denial; the BIA reasonably balanced factors and discretion is not reviewable on appeal.

Key Cases Cited

Waldron v. Holder, 688 F.3d 354 (8th Cir. 2012) (BIA may weigh IJ findings differently but may not supplant them absent clear error)
Garcia‑Mata v. Sessions, 893 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard of review for legal questions is de novo)
White v. INS, 6 F.3d 1312 (8th Cir. 1993) (motions to reopen/reconsider are new claims; not always required to exhaust by motion)
Etchu‑Njang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 577 (8th Cir. 2005) (aliens must exhaust particular issues before seeking judicial review)
Lasu v. Barr, 970 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 2020) (failure to move the BIA to reconsider/reopen bars judicial review of new factfinding claim)
Meng Hua Wan v. Holder, 776 F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2015) (jurisdiction lacking when BIA decision gives rise to new issue not presented to the agency)
Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2009) (same exhaustion principle)
Sidabutar v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2007) (same exhaustion principle)
Saleheen v. Holder, 618 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2010) (eligibility for §1229b(b) relief is reviewable; the ultimate discretionary denial is not)