Serge Dasque v. Fabiola Aidee Dasque, 13-13-00645-CV

Background

Serge (S.D.) and Fabiola (F.D.) Dasque had a long relationship, married in July 2007, separated Nov. 2008, and have a child C.S.D. (born 2001).
S.D. filed for divorce in Dec. 2008 (Cause F-5441-08-5). A May 2009 hearing produced an oral agreement on custody/possession and child support but the court did not resolve community debt and did not enter a written final decree then.
The 2008 case was later dismissed for want of prosecution (Aug. 2010). F.D. filed a verified motion to reinstate; the court orally accepted the parties’ agreement and reinstated the case at an Oct. 7, 2010 hearing (no written reinstatement order appears in the record).
County Court at Law No. 7 later entered an April 20, 2012 Decree of Divorce and Modified Visitation Order dividing property, addressing child custody/support, and finding jurisdiction. Two months later F.D. filed a second divorce petition (this appeal arises from the subsequent decree entered in Aug. 2013).
At the June 2013 trial the court awarded F.D. primary custody and ordered S.D. limited visitation and a disproportionate share of community credit-card debt. S.D. appeals, arguing lack of jurisdiction (because of the prior final decree), inequitable property division, and custody/possession error.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (S.D.)	Defendant's Argument (F.D.)	Held / Relief Sought
1) Whether the later Final Divorce Decree is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction	April 2012 Decree in Cause F-5441-08-7 was a final adjudication of property and child matters; therefore a second divorce action is moot and the later court lacked jurisdiction	F.D. contends dismissal then reinstatement were irregular because no written reinstatement order was entered; she argues the later proceedings were needed because prior decree was void or procedurally deficient	Appellant asks court to vacate the later decree as void or reverse for lack of jurisdiction; brief argues reinstatement was effective (oral agreement and docket activity) so prior decree is binding
2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by disproportionately assigning community debt to S.D.	Debt was largely incurred for mutual, routine household expenses; no evidence supports assigning the bulk of community credit-card debt to S.D.; division must be just and right	Court below allocated most credit-card obligations to S.D.; F.D. argued some pre-marriage debts and differing contributions	Appellant requests reversal or remand to reallocate community liabilities because record lacks facts to support the disparity
3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding primary custody to F.D. and limiting S.D.’s visitation	S.D. had long-standing extended-visitation arrangement (weekly Thurs–Sun), actively parented the child, and presented uncontradicted concerns about F.D.’s supervision and neglect; social study found both parents fit	F.D. claimed extended visitation became unworkable and contested change back to the prior schedule; invoked practical concerns and earlier modifications	Appellant seeks award of custody or extended visitation consistent with prior agreement; argues trial court ignored unrebutted favorable evidence for S.D.
4) Whether a written reinstatement order was required to validate the April 2012 decree	S.D. argues reinstatement was effective by oral court acceptance and follow-up docket activity; parties and court acted as if case was reinstated and a final decree was entered	F.D. (and Attorney General’s counsel at times) pointed to procedural confusion and lack of formal reinstatement order to justify refiling	Appellant contends exceptions to Emerald Oaks permit treating oral reinstatement/docket entries as effective and thus the April 2012 decree is valid

Key Cases Cited

Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000) (subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived)
Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1990) (judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void)
Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. 2011) (final divorce judgment bars relitigation of property division)
Reiss v. Reiss, 118 S.W.3d 439 (Tex. 2003) (same principle: final decree precludes collateral attack on property division)
Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. 2009) (collateral attack on divorce decree and limits on relief)
Emerald Oaks Hotel/Conference Ctr., Inc. v. Zardenetta, 776 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1989) (written order of reinstatement required under Rule 165a(3); but courts recognize limited exceptions)
Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998) (factors and standard for equitable division of community property)