Serge Adamov v. US Bank Nat'l Assoc.
681 F. App'x 473
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Serge Adamov, a U.S. Bank district manager and Azerbaijani immigrant, complained of national-origin discrimination by supervisor Richard Hartnack in early 2009.
- In June–July 2009 U.S. Bank’s corporate security opened an investigation into Adamov’s wire transfers; Adamov told investigators he believed the inquiry was motivated by his national origin complaint.
- Investigators discovered a $10,000 loan Adamov made in 2007 to a friend who was a bank customer; corporate security later relied on an ethics policy excerpt to justify termination.
- On August 20–31, 2009, a team including corporate security personnel and Hartnack recommended and decided to terminate Adamov for alleged ethics violations; he was terminated August 31, 2009.
- Adamov sued under Title VII for national-origin discrimination and retaliation; district court granted summary judgment for the bank on all claims; this court previously reversed on retaliation but later the district court again granted summary judgment; on this appeal the Sixth Circuit reverses the district court on retaliation and remands.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causation for retaliation prima facie case | Adamov: termination occurred ~3 weeks after complaint to investigators and ~1 month after earlier complaint — temporal proximity plus increased scrutiny establishes causation | U.S. Bank: investigation began before Adamov’s July complaint (June computer sweep); termination was based on legitimate ethics concerns, so temporal proximity is not probative | Court: Temporal proximity (~3 weeks/1 month) plus evidence of increased scrutiny ("Smoking Gun" email; reliance on a 2008 policy not in effect in 2007) suffice to create an inference of causation at summary judgment |
| Pretext (whether proffered reason was the real motive) | Adamov: operative 2006 ethics policy did not prohibit lending to customers; bank relied on 2008 wording and heightened scrutiny — jury could find proffered reason pretextual | U.S. Bank: legitimate, nonretaliatory reason — personal loan to customer created conflict risk; honest belief in policy violation justified termination | Court: Genuine dispute exists whether the loan was the real reason; differences in policies and timing support a reasonable jury finding pretext and unlawful retaliation |
| Applicability of temporal-proximity doctrine post‑Nassar | Adamov: temporal proximity still can establish causation for retaliation; must show but‑for causation ultimately | U.S. Bank: argues temporal proximity insufficient given prior investigation | Court: Reaffirms that short temporal proximity can supply causation but when some time elapses evidence of increased scrutiny or other evidence must accompany it; here both present |
| Whether employer "previously contemplated" termination (defeats temporal inference) | Adamov: no evidence U.S. Bank had previously contemplated termination; recommendation and decision occurred after his complaints | U.S. Bank: investigation and computer sweep began in June; discipline/termination was already being considered, so proximity is not evidence of causation | Court: Disagrees that termination was previously contemplated such that temporal proximity is meaningless; factual dispute exists and must go to a jury |
Key Cases Cited
- Ford Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C., 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2015) (framework for retaliation analysis and burden-shifting; but-for causation required)
- Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 133 S.Ct. 2517 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Montell v. Diversified Clinical Servs., Inc., 757 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2014) (temporal proximity can establish causation; where delay exists, must couple with other evidence)
- Hamilton v. Gen. Elec. Co., 556 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2009) (increased scrutiny combined with temporal proximity supports causal inference)
- Cooper v. City of N. Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1986) (longer delays may defeat inference from temporal proximity)
- Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2007) (honest-belief rule: employer must point to specific facts that justified its belief in the proffered reason)