SER Jon Veard v. Hon. Lawrance S. Miller, Jr., Judge
238 W. Va. 333
| W. Va. | 2016Background
- Summers (plaintiff) was the defendant in a magistrate eviction proceeding brought by Plum Hill (petitioners); he filed a pro se counterclaim in magistrate court for unpaid wages and lost on that claim at the magistrate level and appealed to circuit court.
- While that magistrate appeal was pending, Summers (now with counsel) filed an original-jurisdiction civil complaint in circuit court asserting: Count I (quantum meruit/unpaid wages), Count II (liquidated damages under the Wage Payment and Collection Act), and Count IV (Harless wrongful discharge).
- The circuit court consolidated the magistrate appeal and the new circuit-court action under W. Va. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and stated consolidation would be “for all purposes” including discovery and trial.
- Petitioners moved to dismiss Counts I, II, and IV, arguing the wage claims were litigated in magistrate court and the new Harless claim was an improper new cause of action on appeal. The circuit court denied dismissal; petitioners sought a writ of prohibition.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals granted a moulded writ: it clarified scope of consolidation, held that unpaid-wage claims may proceed only as amendments to the magistrate appeal (subject to magistrate monetary limits), and dismissed the Harless claim as not embraceable by the magistrate pleading.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Summers) | Defendant's Argument (Veard/Plum Hill) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether circuit court could consolidate magistrate appeal with original-jurisdiction action and permit discovery/jury | Consolidation under Rule 42(a) allows full consolidation and normal civil procedures | Consolidation was improper to the extent it converted the magistrate appeal into a case subject to discovery and jury trial | Circuit court may consolidate, but consolidation does not allow discovery (Rules 26–37) or a jury trial for the magistrate appeal; de novo bench trial only |
| Whether Counts I (quantum meruit) and II (statutory liquidated damages) are barred by res judicata/collateral estoppel because magistrate litigated unpaid wages | Parties/claims differ; denial of preclusion; original circuit complaint is independent | Wage claims litigated in magistrate court; should be precluded or limited | Collateral estoppel/res judicata apply only once magistrate judgment is final; but where appeal pending, the new circuit complaint must be treated as an amendment to the magistrate pleadings; Counts I & II can proceed only as amendments and recovery is limited to magistrate jurisdictional limits at time of original filing |
| Whether a liquidated-damages claim under the Wage Payment and Collection Act (Count II) is an impermissible new cause of action on appeal | Count II is distinct and actionable in circuit court | Count II injects a new cause of action not included in magistrate pleading | Court treats Count II as embraced by the unpaid-wages claim (statutory liquidated damages are ordinarily part of unpaid-wage claims) and therefore allowable as an amendment, subject to magistrate monetary limits |
| Whether Count IV (Harless wrongful discharge) may proceed in circuit court while magistrate appeal pending | Harless claim can proceed independently in circuit court | Harless is a new cause of action not embraced by the magistrate unpaid-wages claim and therefore not allowable on appeal | Harless claim is a new cause of action and is not embraced by the magistrate pleading; it must be dismissed as beyond the circuit court’s authority in the magistrate appeal (and cannot be pursued there) |
Key Cases Cited
- Monongahela Power Co. v. Starcher, 174 W. Va. 593, 328 S.E.2d 200 (W. Va. 1985) (when magistrate appeal is pending, a later original circuit complaint arising from same facts should be treated as an amendment to the magistrate pleadings and recovery cannot exceed magistrate limits)
- Truglio v. Julio, 174 W. Va. 66, 322 S.E.2d 698 (W. Va. 1984) (a valid magistrate judgment that is not appealed bars relitigation in circuit court)
- Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (recognizes wrongful discharge cause of action where discharge contravenes substantial public policy)
- Cordell v. Jarrett, 171 W. Va. 596, 301 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1983) (on appeal from magistrate court, amendments are limited and additional causes of action may not be introduced)