SER C.H. and S.H., Foster Parents of J.L., Jr. v. Hon. Laura v. Faircloth, Judge, et.al., 815 S.E.2d 540

Infant J.L., Jr., born prematurely, was placed with foster parents C.H. and S.H. and remained in their care for most of his life; he has medical/feeding and developmental needs.
Biological parents A.M. (mother) and J.L. (father) were adjudicated for abuse/neglect, each received post-adjudicatory improvement periods and later extensions; by early 2018 the child had been in foster care 15 of the most recent 22 months.
Foster parents sought to intervene and to present evidence (including by telephone) about the child’s needs; the circuit court denied intervention as premature but permitted foster-parent participation short of party status.
A hearing to consider revocation of the parents’ improvement periods was continued and later rescheduled; foster parents’ counsel had a scheduling conflict and were absent when the court granted the biological parents six-month post-dispositional improvement periods.
Foster parents petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition, arguing the court erred by denying intervention without an evidentiary hearing and by granting improvement periods that violated statutory time limits.
The Supreme Court of Appeals granted the writ: it found foster parents were denied their statutory right to be heard and held they are entitled to intervene as of right once statutory time limits make termination imminent; it vacated the improvement-period order and remanded directing intervention and expedited disposition.

Issue	Foster parents' Argument	Biological parents/DHHR Argument	Held
Denial of intervention without evidentiary hearing	Foster parents contended they were denied their statutory "meaningful opportunity to be heard" and were improperly excluded from presenting evidence	Biological parents and DHHR argued intervention is discretionary, premature before termination, and foster parents had sufficient avenues to be heard	Court held foster parents were denied their §49-4-601(h) right to be heard at the March 28 hearing and must be allowed to intervene when termination is imminent; denial was clear legal error
Granting post-dispositional improvement periods beyond statutory limits	Foster parents argued the court awarded improvement periods despite statutory time-frames (15 of 22 months) and without required findings	Biological parents and DHHR defended the extensions; DHHR later conceded termination may be required under the statutes	Court vacated the post-dispositional improvement-period order as exceeding statutory authority/requirements and directed the court to schedule disposition promptly

State ex rel. Hoover v. Berger, 199 W. Va. 12, 483 S.E.2d 12 (1996) (factors for discretionary writ of prohibition)
In re Harley C., 203 W. Va. 594, 509 S.E.2d 875 (1998) (intervening foster parents have rights and responsibilities of parties and may appeal)
In re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996) (foster parents’ involvement should be distinct from fact-finding; level of participation left to court discretion)
In re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) (primary goal is child’s health and welfare)
State ex rel. Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302, 47 S.E.2d 221 (1948) (welfare of child guides custody discretion)
In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991) (child-abuse cases require prompt resolution; delays harm children)
In re B. H., 233 W. Va. 57, 754 S.E.2d 743 (2014) (best interests standard controls disposition despite parental compliance)
In re Billy Joe M., 206 W. Va. 1, 521 S.E.2d 173 (1999) (concurrent planning for permanency is in child’s best interests)
Amy M. v. Kaufman, 196 W. Va. 251, 470 S.E.2d 205 (1996) (prohibition may restrain courts from granting improvement periods beyond statutory limits)
In re J. G., II, 240 W. Va. 194, 809 S.E.2d 453 (2018) (time limits and statutory requirements for improvement periods are mandatory; courts must make detailed findings)