Senra v. Town of Smithfield, 715 F.3d 34

Senra was hired March 25, 2008 as a probationary Deputy Building Official and needed Rhode Island certification within one year by passing two exams.
Probation was repeatedly extended (six months, then three, then three) as Senra did not obtain certification on time.
In January 2009 a meeting set a new deadline of March 31, 2010; Senra failed to timely enroll for the first exam and later failed the first exam, with no further tests taken.
Town extended probation again in June and September 2009; on November 10, 2009 the Town Manager notified Senra of termination, with administrative leave until November 16 and a hearing thereafter.
Arbitrator later found the Town erred only by not extending to March 31, 2010, reinstating Senra for that period; after reinstatement, Senra again had not certified and was terminated.
Senra filed suit in 2011 alleging due process violations, RI constitutional claims, and a Whistleblowers’ Protection Act claim; federal jurisdiction was invoked after removal; district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and Senra appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Post-termination process sufficiency	Senra contends post-termination arbitration inadequate for due process.	Arbitration can serve as a proper post-termination hearing addressing the termination basis.	Post-termination arbitration adequate; pre/post processes overall satisfy due process.
Scope of post-termination forum for constitutional claims	Arbitrator could not address constitutional/Whistleblower claims.	Need not address all claims; only the basis for termination matters; other claims can be pursued separately.	Arbitration need not resolve constitutional/Whistleblower claims; process still constitutional.
Private right to enforce Rhode Island Art. III, §7	Art. III, §7 grants a private right to hold position during good behavior.	Statutory implementation (ethicsCode) shows §7 is aspirational, not self-executing, with no private right.	No private right under Art. III, §7; not self-executing in context presented.
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act viability	Town fired him for reporting alleged illegal conduct.	Insufficient evidence to support a retaliation claim under the Act.	Summary judgment for Defendants; insufficient evidence to raise triable issue.
Supplemental jurisdiction over state claims	District court should have remanded state claims.	Court acted within discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction.	District court did not abuse discretion; retained jurisdiction.

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1985) (due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond)
Wojcik v. Mass. State Lottery Comm’n, 800 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2002) (pre- and post-termination process analyzed together)
Rumford Pharm., Inc. v. City of East Providence, 970 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1992) (Rhode Island due process remedies considered)
Chmielinski v. Massachusetts, 513 F.3d 309 (1st Cir. 2008) (termination hearing not a court of law; scope of post-termination process)
González-Droz v. González-Colón, 660 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (plaintiff implied challenge of constitutionality; courts adjudicate broader questions)
O’Neill v. Baker, 210 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2000) (state procedural guarantees beyond due process risks handled separately)
Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2005) (post-deprivation remedy sufficiency for due process concerns)
A.F. Lusi Constr., Inc. v. R.I. Convention Ctr. Auth., 934 A.2d 791 (R.I. 2007) (constitutional provision not self-executing; implementing legislation exists)