Semrau v. Commissioner of Social Security, 3:14-cv-01774

Plaintiff John Semrau applied for Disability Insurance Benefits alleging cognitive deficits from a brain disorder with onset July 15, 2008; initial denials and a hearing preceded the ALJ decision denying benefits and Appeals Council denial, making the ALJ decision final.
Record included a 2006 neuropsychological evaluation (Dr. Kareken) and treating neurologist records (Dr. Maniar) from 2009–2012; Semrau testified about memory, concentration, vertigo, tinnitus, asthma, and activity limitations but reported numerous daily activities (driving, mowing, hiking).
ALJ found a severe impairment: disorder of the brain with associated cognitive deficits; nonsevere impairments included vertigo, tinnitus, palpitations, and asthma.
At Step Three the ALJ found the impairment did not meet or medically equal a Listing (discussed Listing 12.02 by name and analyzed evidence).
RFC: ALJ concluded Semrau could perform the full range of work at all exertional levels but with nonexertional limits—short, simple repetitive tasks; sustain attention in two-hour periods; work with set routine; no fast-paced production work.
At Step Five the ALJ relied on a vocational expert (VE) and concluded Semrau could perform jobs existing in significant numbers (e.g., kitchen helper, assembler); district court affirmed the Commissioner.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Step Three — need for medical expert on equivalence	ALJ should have obtained a medical expert per SSR 96-6p before finding no Listing equivalence	State agency consultants addressed equivalence; ALJ analyzed Listing by name and explained why equivalence was unreasonable, so no new expert required	ALJ did not err; SSR 96-6p did not mandate a new medical expert under these facts
RFC articulation and aggregation of impairments	RFC unsupported; ALJ failed to build a logical bridge and consider aggregate effect of nonsevere impairments	ALJ discussed each impairment, cited medical evidence and testimony, and limited work accordingly	RFC supported by substantial evidence and adequately explained
Step Five — reliance on VE without disclosed data sources	VE testimony unreliable because job-number bases were undisclosed	VE testimony was unchallenged at hearing; ALJ may rely on VE if testimony is reliable	No obvious DOT conflict shown on appeal; no remand required for VE disclosure

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863 (7th Cir.) (standard for reviewing ALJ factual findings)
Briscoe v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345 (7th Cir.) (ALJ legal standard review)
Skinner v. Astrue, 478 F.3d 836 (7th Cir.) (substantial evidence standard)
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (U.S.) (definition of substantial evidence)
Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664 (7th Cir.) (ALJ must consider medical expert on equivalence)
Simila v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 503 (7th Cir.) (when medical evidence suffices an ALJ may rely on it without expert)
Green v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 780 (7th Cir.) (circumstances requiring medical expert testimony)
Nelson v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 799 (7th Cir.) (SSR/regulatory basis for equivalence expert requirement)
Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456 (7th Cir.) (claimant may raise SSR 00-4p issues on appeal; must show actual, material, apparent conflict)
Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 731 (7th Cir.) (VE/DOT conflict principles)
Terry v. Astrue, 580 F.3d 471 (7th Cir.) (harmless error when no actual conflict between VE and DOT)
Fast v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 468 (7th Cir.) (Appeals Council denial makes ALJ decision final)