Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Biegalski
0:16-cv-62775
S.D. Fla.Oct 12, 2017Background
- The Seminole Tribe of Florida sued Florida’s Department of Revenue, challenging Florida’s imposition of a utilities tax (particularly on electricity) used on Tribal land; this is the Tribe’s second suit on the issue (Seminole II).
- In Seminole I (filed 2012), the district court granted summary judgment for the Tribe on utility and rental tax claims; the Eleventh Circuit reversed as to the utility tax, holding the legal incidence fell on non‑Indian utilities and the tax was not preempted.
- Seminole II narrows the challenge to fourteen specific Tribal activities (e.g., law enforcement, education, healthcare, gaming) claiming each is burdened by the utility tax and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.
- Defendant Leon Biegalski moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing claim preclusion (res judicata) bars the second suit because it arises from the same cause of action adjudicated in Seminole I.
- The district court considered the prior record, Eleventh Circuit decision, and applied federal preclusion principles, concluding the second suit is barred and dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether claim preclusion bars Seminole II | Seminole: new suit involves only legal questions or narrower claims tied to specific activities, so not the same cause of action | Biegalski: Seminole II arises from same nucleus of operative facts and could have been raised earlier; preclusion applies | Dismissed: claim preclusion bars Seminole II |
| Whether two suits arise from same nucleus of operative facts | Seminole: Seminole I was general; Seminole II adds specific factual detail, so distinct | Biegalski: both suits rest on same core facts — Tribe’s use of electricity on Tribal land and Florida’s tax | Court: same nucleus of operative fact; specific details are encompassed by earlier general allegations |
| Whether the primary right/wrong is the same | Seminole: primary right here limited to particularized activities | Biegalski: primary right is the Tribe’s freedom from the utilities tax generally; no substantive change | Court: primary right is the same — freedom from imposition of the utilities tax; claims are precluded |
| Whether applying preclusion would cause manifest injustice | Seminole: preclusion would be unjust given prospective relief and legal-only issues | Biegalski: no injustice; Tribe made tactical litigation choices | Court: no manifest injustice; preclusion serves important public interests; dismissal with prejudice affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirmative defenses like res judicata may be resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion)
- Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007) (courts may consider documents incorporated into the complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss)
- Sherleigh Assocs., LLC v. Windmere-Durable Holdings, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (judicial notice may be taken of facts capable of accurate and ready determination)
- Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2013) (court documents from earlier actions may be judicially noticed)
- Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1990) (res judicata bars claims that were raised or could have been raised in earlier litigation)
- United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307 (2011) (preclusion analysis asks whether the same evidence would support both actions)
- Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (discussion of preclusion and the principle that new evidence does not avoid res judicata)
- Griswold v. County of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (res judicata serves vital public interests and should not be lightly rejected)
- Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Stranburg, 799 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) (reversing district court as to utility tax, holding legal incidence fell on non‑Indian utility companies)
- Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998) (claims that "could have been brought" are those in existence when the original complaint was filed)