Semaj Milan Yrnah Smith v. State
06-14-00158-CR
| Tex. App. | Jan 30, 2015Background
- Semaj Milan Yrnah Smith (Appellant) faced a motion to revoke community supervision in Hunt County, Texas (Trial Ct. No. CR1300648).
- At the August 22, 2014 revocation hearing, Smith admitted he understood the allegations and pled "true" to all eight allegations, including use of marijuana and cocaine while on probation and failure to make required payments.
- The trial judge asked whether any threats or promises influenced the plea; Smith denied any and confirmed the allegations were true.
- Smith later appealed, arguing trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert to challenge a positive drug test and for failing to object to an allegation regarding unpaid probation payments.
- The State argues counsel’s actions were reasonable given Smith’s admissions and that pleading true to violations is sufficient for revocation; thus Strickland prejudice or deficiency is not shown.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was objectively deficient for not obtaining an expert to challenge a positive drug test | Smith: counsel ineffective for failing to secure an expert to contest drug-test results | State: Smith admitted the drug-use allegation and never claimed test was wrong; counsel had no obligation to litigate against client’s admission | Court: Counsel’s performance not shown to be deficient on the record |
| Whether counsel was deficient for failing to object to alleged failure to make probation payments | Smith: counsel should have objected to payment allegation | State: Smith admitted he understood and that the allegation was true; no record basis for an objection | Court: No deficiency shown; failure to object is within reasonable strategy |
| Whether any deficiency prejudiced the outcome (Strickland prejudice prong) | Smith: errors likely changed result or sentence | State: Pleading true to even one violation suffices for revocation; Smith pled true to eight violations, so no reasonable probability of a different result | Court: No reasonable probability the outcome would differ; prejudice not shown |
| Whether the trial judge indicated willingness to impose a lesser sentence if some probation terms had been met | Smith: judge gave an unambiguous indication a lesser sentence would be likely if compliant | State: Judge’s comments did not promise a lesser sentence; he merely noted probation office policy and expectations; sentence (180 days) stands | Court: No basis that judge would have imposed a lesser sentence; revocation affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (adoption of Strickland standard in Texas)
- Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (definition of reasonable probability for prejudice)
- Guajardo v. State, 24 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000) (pleas of true sufficient for revocation)
- Moore v. State, 11 S.W.3d 495 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000) (proof of one violation sufficient for revocation)