Sellman v. State
144 A.3d 771
| Md. | 2016Background
- At ~2:00 a.m. officers stopped a car in a large apartment complex they characterized as "high crime." They observed Donzel Sellman walk from a dark area and get into the left-rear seat.
- Officers stopped the vehicle for a broken taillight/tag light. Driver Samantha Gillespie (and one passenger) identified why they were in the complex and consented (per officers) to a vehicle search.
- Sellman provided an alias that produced no MVA/record hits. Officers found inconsistencies about who lived in the complex and described Sellman as rigid/nervous in the car.
- Because they were initially outnumbered and before searching the vehicle, officers ordered Sellman out, conducted a Terry frisk, and discovered a handgun and drugs.
- Trial court denied suppression; Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, holding the frisk lacked reasonable suspicion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Sellman) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk Sellman under Terry | Frisk lacked particularized facts tying Sellman to thefts or weapons; conduct was innocent and generalized "high-crime" concerns are insufficient | Totality (late hour, high‑crime location, Sellman emerged from dark area, nervous/rigid behavior, false name, outnumbered officers) justified a frisk for officer safety | No — frisk violated Fourth Amendment; objectively insufficient specific, articulable facts to suspect Sellman was armed and dangerous |
| Whether theft-from-cars suspicion implies weapons use justifying a frisk | Theft-from-cars is not per se a violent crime; cannot infer weapons without additional circumstances | Theft-from-cars can involve tools/weapons and, combined with other facts, can support inference of dangerousness | No bright-line inference; theft-from-cars alone does not automatically justify a frisk—must assess totality and need additional circumstances |
| Lawfulness of routine department policy to frisk before consent search | Routine/policyized frisks without individualized reasonable suspicion are unconstitutional | (State defended officer practice as safety measure) | Departmental practice authorizing routine frisks is unlawful when unsupported by reasonable suspicion; Terry requires case-specific justification |
| Weight of nervousness/other commonsense factors in reasonable‑suspicion analysis | Ordinary nervousness and neutral facts cannot substitute for particularized suspicion | Nervousness plus location, time, false name, and being picked up from dark area can be evaluated in totality | Nervousness is entitled to cautious weight; here it was garden‑variety and, with other facts, insufficient to meet the Terry standard |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishes investigatory stop and protective frisk standard)
- Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009) (to frisk during a traffic stop officer must have reasonable suspicion person is armed and dangerous)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (totality-of-the-circumstances, no divide-and-conquer analysis for suspicion)
- Crosby v. State, 408 Md. 490 (2009) (reasonable suspicion requires particularized, articulable facts; innocent conduct insufficient)
- Bailey v. State, 412 Md. 349 (2010) (frisk limited to pat-down for weapons and requires articulable suspicion)
- Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99 (2003) (caution against accepting generalized location/bulge/nervousness as sufficient without specific inference)
- Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311 (1990) (routine pat-downs are not justified; minor offenses alone do not permit frisk)
- Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356 (1999) (garden‑variety nervousness is too ordinary to infer criminality)