Sekhar v. United States
133 S. Ct. 2720
| SCOTUS | 2013Background
- New York’s Common Retirement Fund is the sole trustee-investor for state and local pension investments, controlled by the State Comptroller.
- The Comptroller’s general counsel recommended against FA Technology Ventures’ fund investment; anonymous emails then threatened to disclose alleged misconduct to wife, officials, and media.
- Some threatening emails traced to petitioner Sekhar, a managing partner of FA Technology Ventures; the government traced other messages to FA offices.
- Sekhar was convicted of attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act for efforts to force a favorable investment recommendation; the jury identified the target as the general counsel’s recommendation to approve the Commitment.
- The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that attempting to obtain a government employee’s recommendation does not constitute obtaining property under the Hobbs Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the general counsel’s recommendation constitutes property under the Hobbs Act | Sekhar argues the recommendation is property obtainable by extortion | The United States contends the recommendation is property obtainable from another | Not extortion; recommendation not property under Hobbs Act |
| Whether an internal government recommendation can be "obtained" or convey a transferable property right | Sekhar asserts an intangible right to give legal advice is property | Government contends such right is not transferable property | Not property; internal recommendations lack transferability under Hobbs Act |
| Whether Scheidler and related precedent require reversal of conviction | Scheidler supports the idea that coercion, not obtaining property, occurred | Government relies on broader extortion theory | Governing principle requires property transfer; conviction reversed |
| What is the proper interpretation of "obtaining of property" in this Hobbs Act context | Property should be understood broadly to include intangible rights | Property must be transferable and capable of passing between persons | Narrow interpretation; not all coercive acts qualify as extortion under Hobbs Act |
Key Cases Cited
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (when Congress borrows common-law terms, it adopts their established meaning)
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (borrowed terms carry their traditional meanings unless instructed otherwise)
- Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003) (extortion requires obtaining property that is transferable or has value)
- Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12 (2000) (license not property under mail fraud; analog applies to Hobbs Act extortion)
- United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) (extortion requires obtaining property, not coercive threats alone)