Securities & Exchange Commission v. Liu
262 F. Supp. 3d 957
C.D. Cal.2017Background
- Charles C. Liu created and controlled three entities (Pacific Proton, PPEB5 Fund, Beverly Proton) to raise EB-5 investor capital (≈ $27M) to build a proton therapy center in California; PPEB5 Fund sold interests at $500,000 each plus $45,000 administrative fees.
- The offering documents (POM/USCIS filings) promised that Capital Contributions would fund development/operation and that Administrative Fees would pay marketing and offering expenses.
- Instead, Liu routed roughly $20M+ of investor proceeds to marketing firms, to himself ($6.7M), and to his wife Xin Wang ($1.54M). Substantial transfers occurred after the SEC subpoenaed Liu in Feb. 2016.
- Little to no construction or EB-5-compliant project development occurred; project permits were never obtained and the USCIS designation was later jeopardized/terminated.
- Liu and Wang repeatedly asserted the Fifth Amendment in depositions, failed to repatriate ordered funds, and withheld records; the SEC moved for summary judgment and sought injunctive and monetary relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (SEC) | Defendant's Argument (Liu/Wang) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are the EB-5 interests securities? | PPEB5 Fund interests are investment contracts under Howey — money invested in a common enterprise with profit expectation from others’ efforts; POM marketed returns. | EB-5 investments are primarily payments for immigration benefits (green cards), not securities, so securities laws do not apply. | Court: Securities law applies; EB-5 shares are securities (Howey test satisfied). |
| Did Liu/Wang violate Securities Act §17(a)(2) by misusing proceeds and omitting material facts? | SEC: POM limited Capital Contributions to project use; defendants diverted millions to marketers and personal salaries, which misled investors and omitted material facts. | Liu/Wang: POM allowed managerial discretion and changes; marketing/compensation did not render disclosures untrue. | Court: Summary judgment for SEC on §17(a)(2). Diversions and omissions violated the Act. |
| Were the omissions/material misrepresentations and negligence established? | SEC: Transfers of ≈$21M (≈75% of proceeds) to insiders/marketers were obviously material; defendants’ conduct showed negligence. | Defendants: Materiality and scienter are jury issues; investors primarily sought visas so misuses were immaterial. | Court: Misappropriation was obviously material as a matter of law; negligence standard for §17(a)(2) satisfied. |
| Remedies: injunction, disgorgement, civil penalties — appropriate amounts? | SEC: Permanent injunction against EB-5 solicitations; disgorgement of total proceeds minus remaining corporate funds (~$26.73M); third-tier civil penalties (Liu ~$6.7M; Wang proposed ~$5.35M). | Defendants dispute amounts/offsets and contend some expenses were legitimate; argue against severity. | Court: Permanent injunction issued; disgorgement ordered (~$26.73M); civil penalty equals Liu’s personal gain ($6,714,580) and Wang’s personal gain ($1,538,000). |
Key Cases Cited
- S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 (2004) (securities laws broadly cover investments framed as investment contracts)
- Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (broad definition of ‘‘security’’ and statutory scope)
- S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (Howey test for investment contracts)
- Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2009) (focus on what purchasers were offered/promised when assessing expectation of profit)
- Goldfield Deep Mines Co. v. S.E.C., 758 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1985) (investor motive for nonpecuniary benefits does not preclude securities characterization)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burdens)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine issue of material fact standard)
- TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (materiality standard for omissions)
- Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (adverse inferences permitted in civil cases when privilege asserted)
- Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2000) (limits/process for drawing adverse inferences from Fifth Amendment assertions)
- S.E.C. v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (disgorgement principles and calculating proceeds)
- S.E.C. v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1998) (disgorgement approximation standard)
- Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter definition)
- S.E.C. v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1996) (factors for permanent injunction)
- S.E.C. v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980) (likelihood of future violations for injunction)
