300 F. Supp. 3d 312
D. Mass.2018Background
- SEC sued Cheryl Jones alleging she was a "necessary and substantial" participant in her brother Mark Jones's Ponzi-style Bridge Fund and violated Sections 5(a) and 5(c) by selling unregistered promissory-note securities. The suit sought disgorgement and a permanent injunction.
- The SEC filed the complaint on July 3, 2017; the five-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 made the relevant limitations period July 3, 2012–July 3, 2017.
- Court authorized limited discovery focused on timeliness (interrogatories, document requests, and Cheryl Jones's deposition) and treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment on the limitations issue.
- SEC's evidence of post-July 3, 2012 involvement: (a) commission payments to Jones; (b) communications between Jones and several investors; (c) Jones advising her brother about addressing investor concerns; and (d) three investors purchasing additional securities totaling over $540,000 during the limitations period.
- Court found no record evidence that Jones recruited new investors after July 3, 2012 or that her post-2012 conduct was a "necessary" or "substantial" factor in sales; mere passing of information, reassurance, or receipt of commissions was insufficient to impose strict Section 5 liability.
- Because the Section 5 claims accrued when the alleged fraud occurred (not on SEC discovery) and the SEC produced insufficient evidence of covered conduct within the five-year window, the court granted summary judgment for Jones on disgorgement and civil penalties and denied injunctive relief as overbroad/unenforceable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SEC's Section 5 claims are timely under the five-year statute of limitations | SEC: Jones continued to facilitate sales during limitations period by communicating with investors, calming concerns, and receiving commissions, which led to additional investments. | Jones: No evidence she solicited new investors or materially participated in sales after July 3, 2012; commissions and occasional communications are de minimis. | Held: Claims are time-barred; SEC failed to show Jones was a necessary or substantial participant during the limitations period. |
| Whether Jones's role satisfies Section 5 "sale/offer" element via necessary/substantial-participant test | SEC: Jones's interactions and relationship with investors support an inference she was a necessary/substantial participant in post-2012 transactions. | Jones: Conduct cited (passing website, relaying concerns, brief conversations) is too trivial to meet necessary/substantial-participant or even but-for causation standards. | Held: Conduct is de minimis; does not meet necessary/substantial or but-for causation for Section 5 liability. |
| Whether receipt of commissions alone supports Section 5 liability | SEC: Commission payments evidence participation in the sales. | Jones: Passive receipt of commissions is insufficient as matter of law to establish necessary/substantial participation. | Held: Commissions alone do not establish liability. |
| Whether equitable injunctive relief can be granted despite statute of limitations | SEC: Equitable relief is not time-barred and remains available. | Jones: No meaningful injunctive relief possible (fund defunct, brother incarcerated); injunction would be vague/overbroad. | Held: Denied; no specific, enforceable injunction appropriate under Rule 65(d). |
Key Cases Cited
- SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436 (1st Cir. 2010) (pleading standard and inference rules)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must plead facts raising claim above speculative level)
- E.E.O.C. v. Green, 76 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1996) (conversion of 12(b) motion to summary judgment and notice considerations)
- Chaparro-Febus v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1575, 983 F.2d 325 (1st Cir. 1992) (notice requirement not mechanically enforced)
- Whiting v. Maiolini, 921 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1990) (when conversion notice may be required)
- SEC v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 729 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2013) (caution in applying necessary-participant/substantial-factor test to avoid capturing de minimis actors)
- Zacharias v. SEC, 569 F.3d 458 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (substantial factor test for Section 5 participation)
- SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1982) (necessary and substantial participant standard)
- SEC v. Phan, 500 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) (example where defendant exercised decisive control constituting substantial participation)
- Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442 (2013) (accrual rule for § 2462 limitations period)
- SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980) (criticizing expansive but-for causation for Section 5 liability)
