60 Cal.App.5th 43
Cal. Ct. App.2021Background
- Pro se petitioner Queen Searles filed a civil harassment restraining order (CH-100) against Michael Archangel, listing his address as "None/homeless," and obtained an ex parte TRO the same day.
- Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6(m) requires the respondent be personally served with the petition, TRO (if any), and notice of hearing at least five days before the hearing.
- Sheriff attempts to serve Archangel at locations where he was seen were unsuccessful; Searles repeatedly moved for continuances and the TRO was repeatedly extended.
- Searles sought court authorization to waive traditional service and serve Archangel via social media (posting to Scribd and linking to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube), citing out-of-state decisions and CCP § 413.30.
- The superior court denied alternative service requests, gave Searles additional time to effect personal service, and ultimately dismissed the petition without prejudice after personal service remained uncompleted.
- On appeal the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding § 527.6(m)’s personal-service requirement controls and § 413.30 does not authorize social-media service in civil harassment restraining order proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument / Court's Position | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a court may authorize alternative service by social media in a civil harassment restraining order case when personal service cannot be effected | Searles: § 413.30 allows the court to direct service "reasonably calculated" to give actual notice; out-of-state courts have authorized social-media service in similar circumstances | Court: § 527.6(m) expressly requires personal service; because the statute provides the exclusive notice mechanism for these proceedings, § 413.30 does not apply to permit alternative service | Court affirmed denial of social-media service; personal service required under § 527.6(m) |
| Whether insisting on personal service violated petitioner’s due process or access-to-court rights | Searles: inability to effect personal service effectively prevents relief and implicates victims’ rights and due process | Court: Searles received extended TRO protection and repeated opportunities to effect service; fee waiver and sheriff service were available; dismissal was without prejudice and did not deny due process | Court held requiring personal service did not violate due process; dismissal without prejudice was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 48 Misc.3d 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015) (authorized Facebook direct-message service in a divorce action where traditional service was impracticable)
- K.A. v. J.L., 450 N.J. Super. 247 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (approved service via Facebook under court rules permitting alternative service when personal service attempts fail)
- Cohen v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Cal.App.3d 236 (1971) (recognized courts’ equitable power to modify service methods for indigent litigants when statutory methods are impracticable)
- Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process may require access to judicial processes for indigent litigants in divorce proceedings)