Searcy v. Progressive Insurance
3:22-cv-02803
| N.D. Tex. | Nov 30, 2023Background
- Pro se plaintiff Candace Searcy sued Progressive Insurance alleging that a Progressive-insured lied at a Tarrant County trial about an accident and used a racial slur; she characterized the conduct as a federal hate crime and sought damages.
- Defendant Progressive moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
- The magistrate judge recommended dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; the district court accepted that recommendation and dismissed the case on April 19, 2023.
- Searcy appealed and, more than 28 days after dismissal, filed a motion to reopen claiming no answer was filed and seeking monetary relief while refusing to pay filing fees.
- Because the motion was filed after 28 days, the court treated it as a Rule 60(b) motion; Rule 60(b) requires extraordinary circumstances to reopen a final judgment.
- The magistrate judge recommended denying the construed Rule 60(b) motion because Searcy did not address the jurisdictional basis for dismissal and failed to show the requisite extraordinary circumstances; the court retains jurisdiction to deny the motion despite the pending appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject-matter jurisdiction | Searcy asserts federal-question jurisdiction by calling the defendant's conduct a federal hate crime/federal offense | Progressive argued Searcy failed to show a federal basis for jurisdiction | Court dismissed for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction |
| Motion to reopen timing/characterization | Searcy asked the court to reopen the case and award damages, complaining of no answer and refusing to pay fees | Defendant/ court treated the post-28-day filing as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment | Motion construed under Rule 60(b) because it was filed beyond 28 days |
| Rule 60(b) standard and application | Searcy sought reopening but did not address why the judgment should be vacated | Court required a showing of unusual/extraordinary circumstances to vacate a final proceeding | Searcy failed to show unusual or unique circumstances; Rule 60(b) relief denied |
| Effect of pending appeal / court authority to rule | Searcy had appealed the dismissal and sought reopening | Court cited authority and Rule 62.1 to show it retains jurisdiction to act on the Rule 60(b) motion despite the appeal | Court retained jurisdiction to and should deny the motion; recommended denial |
Key Cases Cited
- Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2012) (treating post-28-day postjudgment filings as governed by Rule 60(b))
- Tex. A&M Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc., 338 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2003) (procedural rules on vacating final judgments under Rule 60(b))
- Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2013) (Rule 41(a)(1)(A) voluntary dismissal is a final proceeding subject to Rule 60(b))
- Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc., 396 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2005) (Rule 60(b) balances finality with justice)
- Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing limitations on reopening final judgments)
- Pryor v. U.S. Postal Servs., 769 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rule 60(b) relief is extraordinary)
- Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir. 1998) (caution in reopening judgments; extraordinary nature of Rule 60(b))
- Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (failure to file specific objections to magistrate judge's findings bars appellate review)