Seamon Ex Rel. Estate of Seamon v. Remington Arms Co., 813 F.3d 983

Background

Kenneth Seamon was found dead in an elevated tree stand with a single gunshot wound; his Remington Model 700 rifle was 13 feet below with the safety off, a live round in the chamber, and no gunshot residue on his person. Circumstantial evidence suggested the rifle fired while separated from his body.
Plaintiff (Cynthia Seamon, personal representative) sued Remington alleging a design defect in the Model 700’s Walker trigger system caused an uncommanded discharge.
Plaintiff’s expert, Charles Powell, opined the connector/sear engagement can be impaired by minute "interferences" (debris, deposits, moisture, etc.), producing a low sear engagement that can allow a "jar-off" discharge without a trigger pull. Powell found debris in the subject rifle’s fire control housing and concluded the rifle could have fired when jarred.
Remington moved to exclude Powell’s causation opinion as speculative and unreliable under Rule 702/Daubert; the district court granted the motion to exclude and then granted summary judgment for Remington (relying entirely on exclusion).
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the exclusion for abuse of discretion and reversed, finding the district court mischaracterized Powell’s analysis regarding alternative causes and misread the factual support for his opinion. The court vacated summary judgment and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of expert causation under Rule 702 (reliability)	Powell reliably applied experience and testing to conclude debris caused inadequate sear engagement and a jar-off discharge; he ruled out a trigger pull based on absence of residue and scene evidence	Powell’s opinion is speculative: he didn’t replicate a jar-off, didn’t show precipitous sear engagement at time of firing, and failed to adequately exclude alternative causes (e.g., trigger pull)	Reversed exclusion. Court held district court mischaracterized Powell’s testimony and evidence; Powell addressed alternatives and had factual support (debris, scene consistency) sufficient for Daubert fit and reliability questions for the jury
Scope of district court gatekeeping vs. weight of evidence	Once Daubert is satisfied, persuasiveness is for the jury; expert need not prove causation conclusively at summary judgment	If expert opinion is as-or-more-speculative than plausible, it should be excluded as unreliable	Court reiterated that disagreements over strength of inference go to weight, not admissibility; exclusion was abuse of discretion
Effect of exclusion on summary judgment	Without Powell’s testimony, genuine dispute disappears; summary judgment for Remington improper if expert admissible	Summary judgment proper if expert excluded because Plaintiff lacks causation evidence	Because exclusion reversed, summary judgment reversed and case remanded
Requirement to replicate alleged mechanism in testing	Powell did not need to recreate jar-off because the rifle’s post-firing condition would differ from pre-firing condition; his failure to test was explained and not fatal	Failure to perform jar-off test undercuts reliability	Court found district court erred in drawing adverse inference from Powell’s explained choice not to perform a jar-off test

Key Cases Cited

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (trial-court gatekeeping inquiry for expert admissibility)
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (Daubert principles apply to all expert testimony)
Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286 (abuse-of-discretion standard for excluding experts)
Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333 (district court cannot weigh persuasiveness as basis for exclusion)
Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d 1322 (reversing exclusion where district court mischaracterized record supporting expert)
O’Neal v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, 803 F.3d 974 (discussing Walker trigger history and prior litigation involving similar expert and rifle model)