Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152

Brittany Sczepanski applied for Supplemental Security Income alleging disability from anxiety, depression, selective mutism, and related limitations.
At hearing she testified about severe social anxiety, selective mutism, auditory processing problems, and inability to concentrate in noisy environments.
The ALJ found an RFC permitting work at all exertional levels but with nonexertional limits: no public contact, only occasional supervisor/coworker contact, no fast‑paced/assembly‑line work, only mild noise exposure, and ability to miss up to one day of work per month.
A vocational expert (VE) testified that a similarly restricted hypothetical person could work as a laundry laborer, industrial cleaner, or shirt folder (nearly 3 million national jobs), but said employers typically allow no absences during a 90–120 day probationary period.
During the hearing the ALJ stated probationary-period tolerance was irrelevant; the ALJ’s written decision did not address probationary periods and denied benefits; the district court affirmed.
On appeal the Second Circuit held that whether a claimant can complete a probationary period is relevant to the Step 5 disability inquiry and remanded for further development of the record.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ability to complete a probationary period is relevant at Step 5	Sczepanski: inability to pass probation (VE: no tolerated absences) means she cannot sustain the jobs identified	Commissioner: probationary periods are hiring/employer practices and irrelevant; inability to be hired does not equal disability	Court: Ability to complete probation is relevant; ALJ erred in treating it as irrelevant; vacated and remanded
Appropriate remedy	Sczepanski: award benefits because probation intolerance eliminates the identified jobs	Commissioner: no error; if error, remand unwarranted	Court: Remand for further development (not immediate benefits) so Commissioner can show sufficient jobs without probation constraints

Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (standard of appellate review; substantial‑evidence test)
McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2014) (steps of sequential disability evaluation and burden shift at Step Five)
Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999) (standards for remand vs immediate award of benefits)
Gatliff v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 172 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1999) (ability to hold a job, not just to perform job tasks, relevant to substantial gainful activity)
Dix v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1990) (inability to work on a regular basis precludes substantial gainful activity)
Pagan v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (critical question is ability to hold a job for a significant period)
Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding of substantial gainful activity requires more than ability to find work)
Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1994) (ability to hold employment for significant period is relevant)