Scrimo v. Lee
935 F.3d 103
2d Cir.2019Background
- Victim Ruth Williams was strangled in her apartment on April 12, 2000; only Paul Scrimo and John Kane were present. Kane testified that Scrimo killed Williams; Scrimo maintained Kane was the killer.
- Physical evidence (fingerprints, DNA under the victim’s fingernail, DNA on items in the apartment) pointed more strongly to Kane.
- Scrimo’s defense theory: Kane was a drug dealer, Williams was his customer, a drug dispute (or payment with sex) led Kane to choke Williams; defense sought to call three witnesses to prove prior drug sales and a prior choking incident by Kane.
- Trial court allowed cross-examination of Kane about alleged drug sales but excluded proffered defense witnesses as impermissible extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter; Scrimo was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 25 years-to-life.
- Scrimo’s state appeals were denied; he filed a §2254 petition claiming denial of his right to present a complete defense; district court denied relief as harmless error; Second Circuit granted COA and reversed, ordering habeas relief unless the State seeks retrial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether exclusion of testimony about Kane’s drug dealing and prior choking deprived Scrimo of his constitutional right to present a complete defense | Excluded witnesses were not merely for impeachment but would establish Kane’s relationship to victim, motive, and third-party culpability | Trial court treated testimony as collateral impeachment; State argued remoteness and risk of prejudice/confusion outweighed probative value | Court held exclusion violated the right to present a defense because testimony was probative of third‑party guilt and not collateral; reversible error |
| Whether the state court’s evidentiary ruling was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under AEDPA | Exclusion conflicted with Chambers/Crane principles protecting meaningful opportunity to present witnesses and evidence of third‑party culpability | State contended the ruling was a permissible state‑law evidentiary decision and harmless given the rest of the record | Court held the state court unreasonably applied federal law and relief was warranted under AEDPA |
| Whether any alternative evidentiary grounds (remoteness, prejudice, confusion, or modus operandi standards) justified exclusion | Proffer showed contemporaneous purchases with victim and a relevant prior choking incident; probative value outweighed any countervailing risks | State argued remoteness of some acts and that choking incident was not distinctive modus operandi | Court found testimony about drug sales and victim’s purchases could not properly be excluded on alternative grounds; choking incident possibly could have been excluded but overall error was not harmless |
| Whether exclusion was harmless error | Excluded testimony would supply independent support for defense and create reasonable doubt given thin state case | State argued other evidence supported verdict and that cross‑examination already explored drug issues | Court held error was not harmless; excluded evidence would have created reasonable doubt and thus habeas relief required |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (criminal defendants have a fundamental right to present witnesses in their defense)
- Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (defendant entitled to meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense)
- Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (right to present evidence is not unfettered; evidentiary rules may exclude testimony that is incompetent or otherwise inadmissible)
- Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (limits on third‑party guilt evidence cannot be arbitrary when such evidence is critical to defense)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (habeas relief for non‑structural error requires a showing of a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (standards for AEDPA review: "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law)
- Schriver v. Washington, 255 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2001) (right to call witnesses secured by Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments)