Scott v. State, 555 S.W.3d 116

Gregory Scott was convicted by a jury of first-degree aggravated robbery and, after two enhancement allegations were found true, received 65 years' imprisonment.
Factual basis: Scott sat in a laundromat, walked inside, and two co-robbers entered and robbed customers at gunpoint; shell casings and items linked to the robbers and a deceased passenger were recovered; DNA tied Scott to a handgun that fired a projectile at the laundromat scene.
During voir dire the trial court explained the burden of proof and stated that "reasonable doubt ... is what you determine after hearing all of the evidence." Defense did not object.
After the State rested Friday, Scott failed to return from lunch and was absent for the remainder of the trial; the court held a hearing, recessed to Monday, and ultimately proceeded in his absence under article 33.03.
At punishment a bailiff (Deputy Banks) testified about efforts to locate Scott; the prosecutor commented on Scott’s absence. Defense did not object to the testimony or argument.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Scott)	Held
Whether the trial court’s voir dire statement that reasonable doubt "is what you determine after hearing all of the evidence" unconstitutionally lowered the State’s burden	The court’s explanation accurately described that jurors individually assess reasonable doubt; overall charge adequately instructed the jury on beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard	The statement left jurors to define the standard and could allow conviction on less than Winship’s required proof (e.g., preponderance)	Court held the statement was a correct statement of law, the charge as a whole correctly conveyed reasonable doubt, and there was no reasonable likelihood the jury applied an unconstitutional standard — issue overruled.
Whether admitting a bailiff’s testimony about Scott’s absence violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause	The State treated the testimony as factual background showing voluntary absence; Scott voluntarily waived presence by failing to return, so testimony was admissible	Testimony denying Scott the opportunity to confront the witness violated his right to face witnesses because he was absent when Banks testified	Court held Scott failed to preserve the Confrontation Clause complaint (no timely objection at trial) and therefore the claim was waived — issue overruled.

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (trial court need not use particular words; instructions must not permit conviction on less than due process requires)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (Due Process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App.) (better practice is not to define reasonable doubt)
Woods v. State, 152 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. Crim. App.) (charge language that proof must exclude reasonable doubt is permissible)
Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim. App.) (each juror may decide for himself what constitutes beyond a reasonable doubt)
Miller v. State, 692 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Crim. App.) (defendant who voluntarily absents himself after jury selection may forfeit right to be present)
Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (defendant who voluntarily absents himself waives Sixth Amendment right to be present)
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (Confrontation Clause purpose: face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination)