Scott v. Kashmiry
42 N.E.3d 339
Ohio Ct. App.2015Background
- Collision at ~midnight Oct. 2011 at Minnesota Ave. (one-way east) and Bremen St. (two-way with stop sign) in Columbus; Scott driving east struck Officer Kashmiry's cruiser as he entered the intersection.
- Kashmiry, a Columbus police officer, stopped at the Bremen stop sign, checked his onboard computer, looked both ways (despite Minnesota being one-way), believed no traffic was coming, then entered the intersection and was struck.
- Vegetation at the southwest corner partially obstructed sight lines; Kashmiry acknowledged in affidavit he could have entered more slowly in hindsight and was responding to a disturbance call.
- Passengers in Scott’s car stated they did not see the cruiser until immediately before or at impact.
- Appellants sued Kashmiry (negligence) and the City (respondeat superior/negligent entrustment). Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744; trial court granted summary judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether City immune under R.C. 2744 (vehicle-operating exception R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)(a)) | Scott: genuine issue whether Kashmiry’s driving was wanton or willful, so exception applies | City: Kashmiry was responding to emergency; immunity applies unless willful/wanton conduct — here only negligence | Court: City immune; facts show at worst negligence, not willful/wanton conduct |
| Whether Officer Kashmiry personally immune under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) | Scott: Kashmiry’s familiarity with area and obstructed view create factual dispute as to recklessness | Kashmiry: stopped, looked both ways, believed no traffic; no conscious disregard of known risk | Court: Officer immune; conduct was not reckless (only negligent), so immunity applies |
| Whether factual dispute requires jury (Hunter precedent) | Scott: Hunter allows jury when reasonable minds could differ on willful/wanton question | Defendants: circumstances not extreme; reasonable minds can only find negligence | Court: Hunter distinguishable; here reasonable minds only could find negligence, so summary judgment proper |
| Whether Kashmiry’s state of mind/intent supported willful/wanton/reckless standard | Scott: his familiarity and admission he was in a hurry support heightened duty/recklessness | Defendants: no evidence of malicious purpose, bad faith, or conscious disregard; affidavit shows care taken | Court: No evidence of conscious disregard or intent; statutory exceptions not met |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380 (2012) (distinguishes willful, wanton, and reckless standards for political-subdivision liability)
- Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24 (1998) (three-tier R.C. Chapter 2744 immunity framework)
- Hubbard v. Canton City School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451 (2002) (application of three-tier political-subdivision immunity analysis)
- Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 118 Ohio St.3d 392 (2008) (mere negligence does not equal wanton misconduct)
- Thompson v. McNeill, 53 Ohio St.3d 102 (1990) (definition of reckless conduct)