Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.
954 F.3d 502
| 2d Cir. | 2020Background
- Plaintiffs: seven named Apprentices and putative Rule 23 state-law classes (~1,600 members across six states) and a conditionally certified FLSA collective of 523+ opt-ins alleging Chipotle misclassified Apprentices as exempt and denied overtime.
- Chipotle uniformly classified Apprentices as exempt (except in California), used a single job description, and relied on a consultant who concluded the role met the executive exemption; Apprentices performed a mix of managerial and manual tasks and earned salaried pay.
- After extensive discovery (80+ depositions, 240+ declarations), the district court (1) denied Rule 23(b)(3) class certification for lack of predominance/superiority and (2) decertified the FLSA collective, finding opt-ins not “similarly situated.”
- Plaintiffs appealed both rulings; appellate court reviewed denial of class certification for abuse of discretion and the decertification de novo as to legal standards.
- Holding: the court AFFIRMED denial of Rule 23 class certification; VACATED the decertification of the FLSA collective and REMANDED for reconsideration under the correct § 216(b) standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 23(b)(3) class certification satisfies predominance and superiority | Scott: common issues predominate because Chipotle uniformly classified Apprentices and common proof (job description, consultant) applies | Chipotle: plaintiffs’ primary-duty evidence is individualized; managerial duties vary by store/employee | Affirmed denial — individualized primary-duty inquiries outweighed common proof; predominance not met |
| Whether the district court clearly erred in factual findings about variation among Apprentices | Plaintiffs: court misread record and made clearly erroneous factual findings about job duties | Chipotle: factual record shows materially divergent testimony about hiring, scheduling, supervision, time spent on managerial tasks | No clear error — appellate court found district court’s factual parsing permissible |
| Whether decertification of the FLSA collective was proper | Collective plaintiffs: district court imported Rule 23 via a "sliding scale" and applied too strict a standard; similarly situated requires sharing one or more material legal/factual issues | Chipotle: large, geographically dispersed opt-in group showed disparate duties and individualized defenses justifying decertification | Vacated decertification — court held district court erred by conflating § 216(b) with Rule 23; remand to reassess "similarly situated" under proper standard |
| Proper legal standard for "similarly situated" under § 216(b) | Plaintiffs/appellate majority: named and opt-in plaintiffs are similarly situated to the extent they share one or more issues of law or fact material to disposition of FLSA claims; dissimilarities in other respects do not automatically defeat collective treatment | Dissent/Chipotle: adopt an ad hoc, case-by-case balancing weighing similarities and dissimilarities (including number/geography of opt-ins) and permit district courts broad gatekeeping discretion | Appellate majority: adopt material-issue test; reject Rule 23 "sliding scale" analogy; permit consideration of relevant factors but emphasize § 216(b) is distinct and less demanding than Rule 23 |
Key Cases Cited
- Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537 (2d Cir. 2010) (exemption inquiry depends on actual duties; used in analyzing class/collective certification interplay)
- Glatt v. Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc., 811 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 2016) (endorses two-step conditional/decertification framework for § 216(b))
- Pippins v. KPMG, LLP, 759 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014) (distinguishes factual time-allocation questions from legal exemption questions)
- Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (collective actions allow pooling resources and efficient resolution of common issues)
- Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (characterizes § 216(b) as a joinder process and discusses collective-action rights)
- Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (predominance and cohesion principles for class actions)
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (what counts as a common answer in Rule 23(a) commonality analysis)
- Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2018) (critique of ad hoc test and guidance on meaning of “similarly situated”)
- O'Brien v. Ed Connelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (rejects improper application of Rule 23 standards to § 216(b))
- Thiessen v. Gen. Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001) (explains § 216(b) "similarly situated" is distinct from Rule 23 and rejects importing Rule 23)
- Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (§ 216(b) standard is independent of Rule 23)