Scott v. Berryhill
0:16-cv-03159
| D. Minnesota | Jan 12, 2018Background
- Plaintiff Tanisha Scott applied for Title II disability insurance benefits, alleging onset April 6, 2010; application denied administratively and by ALJ on July 31, 2015; Appeals Council denied review, making ALJ decision final.
- Date last insured: March 31, 2014. Claimant’s diagnoses included major recurrent depression, PTSD, complicated bereavement, insomnia, and a personality disorder.
- Mental-health treatment history: intermittent psychiatric care; treated by Dr. Corby Benson (treating psychiatrist) six times between June 2013 and Feb 2015; documented medication noncompliance and symptom fluctuation with/without meds.
- Dr. Benson’s March 24, 2015 Medical Source Statement (after date-last-insured) assessed very severe limitations across concentration, persistence, social interaction, and ability to sustain work.
- Two state agency psychologists (Drs. Sullivan and Nelsen) found mild-to-moderate functional limits and concluded claimant could perform routine, unskilled work with reduced stress and limited social demands.
- ALJ’s RFC: full range of exertional work but limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks; occasional decision making, occasional brief/superficial interactions; gave state-agency opinions substantial weight and Dr. Benson moderate weight; concluded claimant not disabled at step five (jobs available).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Weight of treating psychiatrist opinion (Dr. Benson) | Dr. Benson entitled to controlling weight; ALJ wrongly discounted his March 2015 opinion | ALJ permissibly gave it moderate weight because the opinion post‑dates DLI, is inconsistent with record, and fails to account for medication noncompliance and infrequent treatment | Court upheld ALJ: moderate weight appropriate (opinion after DLI, lacks retroactive timeframe, inconsistent with records and noncompliance) |
| Weight of state‑agency psychologists | ALJ erred by relying on state consultants over treating source | State consultants’ opinions are consistent with record and claimant’s activities; properly given substantial weight | Court held ALJ properly gave substantial weight to state consultants; their limits align with medical record and RFC |
| Reliance on post‑DLI evidence | Post‑DLI evidence can elucidate severity; Dr. Benson’s post‑DLI opinion should be credited | Post‑DLI evidence here reflects periods off medication and does not show greater severity during insured period | Court concluded post‑DLI evidence did not undermine ALJ; it underscored noncompliance and did not establish disabling severity before DLI |
| Substantial‑evidence challenge to denial | ALJ ignored or cherry‑picked favorable evidence; RFC unsupported | ALJ considered record, symptom reports, treatment notes, activities, and reasoned why limitations are limited to unskilled work | Court found substantial evidence supports ALJ’s findings and denial of benefits |
Key Cases Cited
- Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853 (8th Cir. 2000) (burden shifts to Commissioner at step five to show other work exists)
- Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 1993) (court will not substitute its judgment for ALJ)
- Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2008) (court defers where substantial evidence supports ALJ even if record could support contrary outcome)
- Aguiniga v. Colvin, 833 F.3d 896 (8th Cir. 2016) (ALJ may discount treating opinion unsupported by treatment notes)
- Reece v. Colvin, 834 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2016) (ALJ may discount treating opinion based on subjective complaints when unsupported by objective evidence)
- Owen v. Astrue, 551 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2008) (claimant noncompliance can be inconsistent with treating physician opinion)
- Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2004) (if impairment controllable by treatment, it cannot be disabling)
- Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2010) (ALJ properly discounted treating opinion that failed to account for claimant noncompliance)
- Hutsell v. Massanari, 259 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2001) (distinguishing evidence of intermittent improvement from risk of unpredictable decompensation)
- Cox v. Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 2006) (ALJ may give less weight to opinions written after DLI or inconsistent with record)
- Pyland v. Apfel, 149 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1998) (post‑DLI evidence may elucidate severity but must be evaluated in context)