Scott Perreault v. Willie Smith, 874 F.3d 516

In 2009, Scott Perreault was convicted by a Michigan jury of first‑degree felony murder and first‑degree child abuse for the fatal blunt‑force head trauma to his four‑month‑old daughter; he was sentenced to life in prison.
At trial Perreault claimed the injury resulted from an accidental fall while holding the baby; the prosecution relied on expert testimony (Dr. Deibel) that the injury required a high‑impact event inconsistent with a household fall.
On appeal Perreault raised multiple claims in state court (including suppression issues); the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court denied relief. He later filed a post‑conviction motion asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which was denied at the state level.
Perreault filed a federal habeas petition; the district court denied relief but issued a certificate of appealability on two questions: (1) whether Perreault’s statement, “Well, then let’s call the lawyer then ‘cause I gave what I could,” was an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the state expert’s scientific basis.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the claims under AEDPA deference and affirmed, holding the state courts did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent on either issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Perreault’s statement was an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel requiring police to stop questioning	Perreault: his comment to “call the lawyer” was a clear request for counsel, so further questioning violated Edwards/Miranda	State: the statement was ambiguous/negotiation‑style (i.e., a threat to walk away), so police reasonably continued questioning	Held: Not an unequivocal invocation; state court’s reading was reasonable under Davis/Edwards and AEDPA
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to probe the scientific basis of the prosecution expert’s opinion	Perreault: counsel’s limited cross‑examination left Deibel’s exclusionary opinion unchallenged and prejudiced the defense	State: counsel made a reasonable strategic choice given conflicting prosecution testimony (Dr. Virani) and adequate questioning on other topics; no deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland	Held: No unreasonable application of Strickland; counsel’s performance was within the range of reasonable professional assistance; ineffective‑assistance claim fails

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial suspects must be advised of right to counsel and silence)
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (if suspect invokes counsel, interrogation must cease until attorney is present)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (invocation of counsel must be unambiguous under an objective standard)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑pronged test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA requires state‑court decisions be given deference; federal relief only for unreasonable applications)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (federal habeas review under AEDPA is generally limited to the state‑court record)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default and cause‑and‑prejudice framework)
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (limiting consideration of post‑invocation statements in evaluating whether Miranda rights were invoked)
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12 (2013) (deference to state‑court evaluations of counsel performance)