Scott Ogle v. Maeli Hector, A/K/A Maeli Arellano, A/K/A Maeli Johnson, 03-16-00716-CV

Ogle sued Hector for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, alleging they formed a written agreement via texts where she would take a lie-detector test in exchange for his nonsuit of a defamation suit and payment of $2,500 in her attorney’s fees.
On November 21, 2014, Ogle texted Hector that he would nonsuit his defamation case and sent her a $2,500 check, asking her to take a polygraph; Hector deposited the check that day but repeatedly denied agreeing to the test.
Ogle later admitted in court and in texts that he told Hector she did not have to take the lie-detector test and that he would pay regardless; he also testified he would not have dismissed the suit but for her alleged promise.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Hector on both breach and promissory-estoppel claims, and awarded Hector $10,150 in attorney’s fees; Ogle appealed only the promissory-estoppel dismissal and the fee award.
The appellate court held Ogle could not show detrimental reliance because he relieved the alleged condition (telling Hector she didn’t have to take the test), and affirmed both the summary judgment and the fee award based on sanctions authority and the record of Ogle’s conduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether promissory estoppel claim survives summary judgment	Ogle: texts and affidavit show Hector promised to take a lie-detector and he relied by nonsuiting and paying $2,500	Hector: texts do not show an actual, specific promise; Ogle admitted payment/nonsuit was not conditional	Affirmed for Hector — Ogle cannot show detrimental reliance because he told her she didn’t have to take the test
Whether attorney’s fees could be awarded though not pled in answer	Ogle: Hector didn’t plead fees; award unsupported and improper as sanctions	Hector: requested fees in motion for summary judgment as sanctions under Ch. 10 and Rule 13; Ogle raised no trial-court objection	Affirmed — Ogle waived pleading objection; record supports implied finding of groundless/bad-faith suit and sanctions
Whether sanctions were authorized and adequately supported	Ogle: award lacked required findings and procedural show-cause; amount unreasonable	Hector: sought sanctions; court considered evidence (attorney affidavit, record of harassment) and heard argument	Affirmed — procedural defects not preserved; record supports that suit was groundless/brought for harassment; fee amount reasonable
Whether fee amount was reasonable	Ogle: amount unreasonable	Hector: attorney affidavit stated hours, customary rate, and total fee; no controverting affidavit	Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion; affidavit and record support reasonableness

English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. 1983) (elements of promissory estoppel)
Davis v. Texas Farm Bureau Ins., 470 S.W.3d 97 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) (promise must be sufficiently specific to justify reliance)
Stable Energy, L.P. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001) (defining specificity for promissory-estoppel promises)
Sandel v. ATP Oil & Gas Corp., 243 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007) (detrimental reliance requires material change of position)
Eberstein v. Hunter, 260 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008) (attorney affidavit must provide factual basis for fee opinion)
Owen Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Brite Day Constr., Inc., 821 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991) (opposing party must file affidavit contesting reasonableness to create fact issue on fees)
In re M.A.N.M., 231 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007) (factors courts may consider in assessing fee reasonableness)