Scott McCray v. Robert Wilkie
966 F.3d 616
7th Cir.2020Background:
- McCray, a VA Mental Health Case Manager with multiple service-related physical and mental disabilities (including PTSD and severe knee problems), requested a replacement van in July 2012 because the assigned van aggravated his knee.
- An ergonomics specialist agreed a different van was needed; VA provided a temporary replacement that was in worse condition, and did not provide an appropriate van until June 2013—shortly after McCray threatened an EEOC complaint (an ~11-month delay).
- In 2014, after a white female coworker complained about a bucking van, all case managers received new vans; a different white female coworker was granted an office move for medical reasons while McCray’s request to move to a lower floor (vacancies existed) was denied.
- McCray filed EEOC charges and then sued under the Rehabilitation Act (failure to accommodate) and Title VII (race and sex discrimination). The magistrate judge dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.
- The Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo, held McCray stated a plausible claim that the VA unreasonably delayed providing the van (failure to accommodate), affirmed dismissal of some other claims, and remanded to allow amendment/clarification as to reassignment/office claims.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Delay in providing van (failure to accommodate under Rehabilitation Act) | VA unreasonably delayed (~11 months) replacing van; lack of interactive process; delay denied effective accommodation | Eventually provided an appropriate van; therefore no failure to accommodate | Reversed dismissal as plausible failure-to-accommodate claim based on unreasonable delay and lack of good-faith interactive process |
| Reassignment / office move as accommodation | Needed reassignment or lower-floor office for panic attacks/concentration (PTSD) or for physical reasons | No showing that reassignment/office was necessary to perform essential job functions; VA could not reassign | Dismissal not sustained as to this claim—court finds allegations unclear; plaintiff may amend to clarify; remanded for further proceedings |
| Title VII disparate treatment (race/sex) from differential accommodations | White female coworkers received vans/offices while McCray (Black male) was denied—evidence of race/sex discrimination | These discrete Title VII theories were not developed in response to the motion to dismiss; therefore not properly presented below | Claims waived for failure to present/brief them in district court; dismissal of these Title VII claims affirmed |
| Pleading-stage review / procedural posture | Complaint alleged sufficient facts to give notice and plausibly state claims | District court moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim; magistrate ruled with prejudice | Seventh Circuit reviews de novo, accepts well-pleaded facts, reverses in part (van delay) and remands; allows amendment on unclear accommodation claims |
Key Cases Cited
- McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1992) (Rehabilitation Act incorporates duty to accommodate)
- Jay v. Intermet Wagner, 233 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2000) (unreasonable delay in accommodation can show discrimination)
- Selenke v. Med. Imaging of Colo., 248 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2001) (factors for assessing reasonableness of delay)
- Yochim v. Carson, 935 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2019) (employer and employee must engage in interactive accommodation process)
- Lawler v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2016) (interactive process requirement for reasonable accommodation)
- Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996) (obstructing or delaying the interactive process can show bad faith)
- Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2013) (short delays in providing equipment may be reasonable)