Scott Huddleston v. State, 630 S.W.3d 436

Appellant Scott Huddleston pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to assault on a public servant, admitted an enhancement, and the trial court assessed punishment at 8 years' imprisonment and a $3,000 fine.
Huddleston objected to the plea hearing being conducted by Zoom under the Texas Supreme Court’s Seventeenth Emergency Order, filed a motion to rescind the Zoom setting, and requested a continuance for an in-person, open-court plea in the physical presence of counsel.
The trial court overruled Huddleston’s objections and accepted his guilty plea via videoconference; Huddleston preserved his right to appeal and the court certified permission to appeal despite the plea-bargain disposition.
The Seventeenth Emergency Order (609 S.W.3d 119) authorized courts, subject to constitutional limits, to modify or suspend procedures and to allow or require remote participation without a participant’s consent, citing Tex. Gov’t Code §22.0035(b).
Huddleston argued the court lacked authority to force a videoconference plea over his objection because Article 27.18 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires written consent of the defendant and prosecutor for videoconference pleas.
The Court of Appeals analyzed whether the emergency order could alter substantive statutory rights and concluded the consent requirement is substantive, so the emergency order could not be used to compel a remote plea over Huddleston’s objection.

Issue	Huddleston's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether a trial court could require a defendant to plead guilty via videoconference over the defendant’s objection under the Texas Supreme Court’s Seventeenth Emergency Order	The emergency order cannot abrogate Huddleston’s statutory right to appear and plead in person; Article 27.18 requires written consent for videoconference pleas	The emergency order authorized courts to require remote participation without consent to protect public health and manage court operations during the disaster	The court held the emergency order cannot be used to override substantive statutory rights; a defendant cannot be compelled to plead via videoconference over objection
Whether a plea entered via videoconference without the statutorily required consent is valid and what remedy is required	Because Article 27.18’s consent condition was not satisfied, the trial court lacked authority to accept the plea; the plea is voidable and requires reversal/remand	The State implicitly argued the plea could stand because the supreme court’s emergency order authorized remote proceedings	The court held the plea was unauthorized and voidable; judgment reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings

Seventeenth Emergency Order Regarding COVID-19 State of Disaster, 609 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. 2020) (supreme court order authorizing temporary modification/suspension of procedures and remote participation during disaster)
Davis v. State, 956 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (judge’s lack of authority may invalidate a guilty plea proceeding)
Lilly v. State, 365 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (failure to afford a public trial can be preserved and requires reversal despite a guilty plea)