Scott Gustafson v. Bi-State Development Agency, 29 F.4th 406

Background

Gustafson, a blind long‑time user of Bi‑State public transit, filed administrative MHRA proceedings in 2006 that the Missouri Commission settled with Bi‑State in 2011 by an agreement releasing claims arising on or before the agreement date; Gustafson did not participate in or seek review of that settlement.
In 2014 Gustafson filed a second Commission complaint alleging three instances (Dec. 26, 2013; June 13, 2014; Aug. 5, 2014) where bus drivers allegedly drove past him (the “drive‑by” incidents); he obtained a right‑to‑sue letter in 2015.
Gustafson sued in state court, later adding ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; Bi‑State removed to federal court. The district court dismissed MHRA claims as inapplicable and limited Gustafson from asserting a private right of action to enforce federal transit regulations after Gustafson told the court he was not pursuing such a claim.
At summary judgment the district court: (1) applied judicial estoppel to bar Gustafson’s regulatory private‑action theory; (2) ruled the drive‑by incidents were barred by the 2011 Agreement (and, alternatively, did not deny meaningful access); and (3) refused to consider a paratransit segregation theory because Gustafson had not timely obtained leave to amend.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed: it upheld judicial estoppel, held Gustafson failed to show denial of meaningful access based on isolated drive‑bys, and concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review denial of leave to amend.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Gustafson may privately enforce federal transit regulations under ADA/Rehab Act	Gustafson contends regulatory violations show intentional discrimination and supports a private right of action	Bi‑State argues no private right exists and Gustafson previously disavowed such a claim	Judicial estoppel bars asserting a private right of action; court need not decide existence of such a private right
Whether judicial estoppel applies	Gustafson says his later position is permissible and not inconsistent	Bi‑State points to Gustafson’s prior statement that he was not seeking to enforce the regulations, which the court relied on	Judicial estoppel applies: Gustafson’s later contrary position is inconsistent, was judicially accepted, and would unfairly prejudice Bi‑State
Whether the drive‑by incidents denied meaningful access under Title II/Rehab Act	Gustafson argues three drive‑bys evidence discrimination and denial of meaningful access	Bi‑State argues incidents were isolated and insufficient as a matter of law	Drive‑bys were isolated, infrequent, and insufficient to show denial of meaningful access; summary judgment for Bi‑State affirmed
Whether denial of leave to amend (paratransit segregation claim) is reviewable	Gustafson contends he sought leave and was denied as futile	Bi‑State contends the appeal does not designate the denial order so no jurisdiction	Court lacks jurisdiction to review denial of leave to amend because the notice of appeal did not designate that order

Key Cases Cited

Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2006) (judicial estoppel applied cautiously; good‑faith mistakes excepted)
Opportunity Fin., LLC v. Kelley, 822 F.3d 451 (8th Cir. 2016) (factors for judicial estoppel)
Scudder v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 900 F.3d 1000 (8th Cir. 2018) (judicial estoppel doctrine explained)
United States v. Hamed, 976 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2020) (inconsistent litigation positions and estoppel)
Childress v. Fox Assocs., LLC, 932 F.3d 1165 (8th Cir. 2019) (standard for reviewing cross‑motions for summary judgment)
Loye v. County of Dakota, 625 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 2010) (Title II requires meaningful access)
Argenyi v. Creighton Univ., 703 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 2013) (meaningful access applies to Rehabilitation Act)
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (U.S. 1985) (equal opportunity/meaningful access principle)
Midgett v. Tri‑County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 254 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2001) (isolated incidents do not establish ADA violation)