Scott Clabourne v. Charles Ryan
868 F.3d 753
9th Cir.2017Background
- Clabourne was resentenced to death by the Arizona courts; the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed in State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379, 983 P.2d 748 (1999).
- Clabourne presented evidence of mental illness (probable schizophrenia) and personality traits (passivity, impulsivity, manipulability) as mitigation at the penalty phase.
- Arizona law at the time required statutory impaired-capacity mitigation to show mental illness was a "major contributing cause" of the crime (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(G)(1)).
- The Arizona Supreme Court credited nonstatutory mitigation for passive personality traits (because they bore a causal connection to the crime) but declined to give mitigating weight to the schizophrenia diagnosis.
- The Ninth Circuit panel originally found the Arizona court had considered Clabourne’s mental health as mitigating and denied habeas relief; Judge Berzon sought rehearing arguing intervening en banc precedent (McKinney) required grant of relief.
- The court denied rehearing; Judges Clifton and Ikuta concurred in that denial, Judge Berzon dissented, urging rehearing and vacatur of the penalty-phase sentence under McKinney.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arizona declined to consider schizophrenia as nonstatutory mitigation in violation of Eddings | Clabourne: Arizona applied a causal-nexus rule and excluded schizophrenia from nonstatutory mitigation | State/majority: Arizona considered mental health generally and afforded some nonstatutory mitigating weight to mental/personality deficiencies | Panel majority: Denied habeas relief — concluded Arizona considered mental health as mitigating; no Eddings violation |
| Effect of McKinney v. Ryan on review standard and outcome | Clabourne/Berzon: McKinney establishes Arizona consistently applied an unconstitutional causal-nexus rule and rejects the heightened "clear indication" test, requiring relief | Panel majority: Did not apply McKinney to change outcome; relied on earlier panel analysis | Dissent (Berzon): McKinney requires granting habeas relief for the penalty phase; majority denied rehearing |
| Proper standard of federal habeas review for alleged Eddings error | Clabourne: AEDPA deference applies without Schad’s "clear indication" gloss; consider broader Arizona precedent per McKinney | Panel majority: Relied on Schad’s "clear indication" requirement in prior panel opinion | En banc precedent (McKinney) rejected Schad; disagreement whether panel should be revisited — rehearing denied |
| Whether panel should rehear case in light of intervening en banc authority | Berzon: Supplemental briefing and McKinney compel rehearing and grant of relief | Clifton/Ikuta: After review, they conclude original panel analysis remains correct; deny rehearing | Rehearing denied; split concurrence/dissent recorded |
Key Cases Cited
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencing court may not refuse to consider relevant mitigating evidence)
- McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. en banc 2015) (Arizona consistently applied unconstitutional causal-nexus test; rejected heightened "clear indication" review)
- State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379 (Ariz. 1999) (affirming death sentence; discussed statutory and nonstatutory mitigation)
- Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2011) (earlier panel applied "clear indication" requirement for Eddings claims)
- Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2012) (addressed scope of record for habeas review; later criticized by McKinney)
- Hedlund v. Ryan, 815 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2016) (example of panel reexamining claims in light of intervening en banc authority)