249 So. 3d 781
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2018Background
- Appellant Scott Mitchell was subject to a civil stalking injunction requested by Taylor N. Brogden (pro se).
- The injunction expired by its own terms before appeal; the court nonetheless considered the appeal because collateral legal consequences can survive expiration.
- The trial court found Mitchell’s conduct met the statutory stalking standard (substantial emotional distress).
- On appeal, the 1st DCA panel reviewed the evidence under the objective, reasonable-person standard required by Florida law.
- The majority concluded the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Brogden, did not show conduct that would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress and reversed the injunction.
- Two judges dissented: one would affirm based on competent substantial evidence; another dissented from the denial of en banc review arguing for greater intra-district uniformity in stalking-review standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mitchell’s conduct caused "substantial emotional distress" to support a stalking injunction under § 784.048(1)(a) | Brogden argued Mitchell’s repeated contacts and behavior caused her substantial emotional distress warranting an injunction | Mitchell argued the contacts were insufficient as a matter of law to cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person | Reversed: evidence insufficient under the objective reasonable-person standard to show substantial emotional distress |
| Whether the appeal is moot because injunction expired | Brogden implicitly contended appeal should proceed to uphold protections | Mitchell argued expiration rendered the appeal moot | Not moot: court applied Murphy v. Reynolds — collateral consequences keep appeal live |
| Proper standard of review for stalking injunction factual findings | Brogden relied on trial-court factual findings of distress | Mitchell urged application of reasonable-person objective standard on appellate review | Court applied objective reasonable-person standard (per Bouters) and found it unsatisfied |
| Whether en banc review was warranted to ensure uniformity in stalking decisions | N/A (no en banc motion by parties) | N/A | Request for en banc denied; dissent argued en banc review needed for decisional uniformity |
Key Cases Cited
- Murphy v. Reynolds, 55 So. 3d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (collateral legal consequences keep an appeal alive despite expiration of injunction)
- Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 1995) (stalking emotional-distress element assessed by objective reasonable-person standard)
- Ashford-Cooper v. Ruff, 230 So. 3d 1283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (reversing stalking injunction where repeated calls/texts would not cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person)
- David v. Schack, 192 So. 3d 625 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (reversing stalking injunction where conduct would not cause substantial emotional distress)
- Plummer v. Forget, 164 So. 3d 109 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (contacts insufficient under reasonable-person standard)
- Leach v. Kersey, 162 So. 3d 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (reasonable person in the petitioner’s situation would not suffer substantial emotional distress from the contacts alleged)
- Touhey v. Seda, 133 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (reversing stalking injunction where contacts did not meet substantial emotional distress standard)
- Goudy v. Duquette, 112 So. 3d 716 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (one-sided or hostile conversation did not cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person)
- Jones v. Jackson, 67 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (threatening messages and statements to third parties did not establish substantial emotional distress for a reasonable person)
- Slack v. Kling, 959 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (two threatening voice messages insufficient to show substantial emotional distress)
- McMath v. Biernacki, 776 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (no evidence that reasonable person would suffer substantial emotional distress from the incidents alleged)