290 So.3d 102
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2020Background
- Mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School killed 17; Meadow Pollack’s parents sued the school resource officer (SRO/deputy), alleging his negligence materially contributed to Meadow’s death.
- Complaint alleges prior red flags about the shooter (threatening social‑media posts, self‑harm, Nazi imagery), a Baker Act evaluation in which the deputy refused to share info or search the shooter’s home, and that the deputy later changed his mind about involuntary commitment.
- On the day of the attack the deputy heard a radio warning, did not immediately order a Code Red, arrived outside Building 12, remained outside in a protected location while shots continued, and radioed for a lockdown that allegedly trapped victims. He also told an arriving officer to “get my six” and misreported the shooter’s location.
- The complaint alleges a duty arising from BSO active‑shooter training and SOPs authorizing immediate entry to preserve life; asserted breaches: failure to enter, neutralize the shooter, intercept him, provide accurate info, and follow policy; alleged but‑for causation and damages.
- The circuit court denied the deputy’s motion to dismiss on the ground of statutory immunity; the Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed de novo (limited to the immunity issue) and affirmed, holding the complaint sufficiently alleges exceptions to statutory immunity ("bad faith," "malicious purpose," or "wanton and willful disregard").
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the amended complaint alleges facts that fall within the exceptions to Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) (bad faith, malicious purpose, wanton and willful disregard) | Parents say the deputy’s failure to enter, ordering/insisting on lockdown, misinforming arriving officers, and deviation from training show the exceptions | Deputy contends the allegations, even if true, do not show the requisite subjective intent or conduct to overcome statutory immunity | Affirmed denial of dismissal: allegations—viewed most favorably to plaintiffs—are sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find exceptions (particularly wanton and willful; bad faith/malicious plausible on inferences) |
| How to define the statutory phrases ("bad faith," "malicious purpose," "wanton and willful disregard") | Plaintiffs rely on established definitions and inferential proof from alleged conduct | Deputy argues plaintiffs’ allegations do not meet the statutory thresholds | Court adopts: "bad faith" ≈ actual malice; "malicious purpose" = ill will/subjective intent to do wrong; "wanton and willful disregard" = conscious, intentional indifference with knowledge damage likely and intentional/knowing conduct; applies them to pleadings |
| Whether Columbine‑era Colorado decisions (Schnurr, Rohrbough) require dismissal here | Parents distinguish: deputy allegedly disobeyed or disregarded his active‑shooter training and SOPs, placing self‑preservation above students | Deputy cites Schnurr/Rohrbough to argue immunity should apply where officers remain outside to secure perimeter | Court distinguishes and declines to follow Schnurr/Rohrbough based on factual differences (training/SOPs and lack of reasons to believe escape would be more dangerous here) |
Key Cases Cited
- Keck v. Eminisor, 104 So. 3d 359 (Fla. 2012) (immunity under § 768.28(9)(a) is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- Preudhomme v. Bailey, 211 So. 3d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (motion‑to‑dismiss standard; accept complaint allegations and reasonable inferences)
- Parker v. State of Fla. Bd. of Regents ex rel. Fla. State Univ., 724 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) ("bad faith" equated with actual malice)
- Eiras v. Florida, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2017) (interpreting "malicious purpose" as ill will/subjective intent to do wrong)
- Richardson v. City of Pompano Beach, 511 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) ("wanton and willful disregard" is more reprehensible than intentional conduct)
- Sierra v. Associated Marine Insts., Inc., 850 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) ("wanton and willful" denotes conduct worse than gross negligence)
- Schnurr v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Jefferson Cty., 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Colo. 2001) (Colo. court granted immunity to deputies who secured perimeter at Columbine)
- Rohrbough v. Stone, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (D. Colo. 2001) (companion Columbine decision applying Colorado "willful and wanton" standard)
- Barth v. Khubani, 748 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1999) (advising special verdicts to avoid the two‑issue rule)
- Furtado v. Yun Chung Law, 51 So. 3d 1269 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (reasonable‑trier‑of‑fact test for whether exceptions to immunity survive summary judgment)