Sclafani v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp.
14 F. Supp. 3d 1351
C.D. Cal.2014Background
- Decedent David Sclafani, Navy boiler technician (1960–1963), developed fatal mesothelioma; plaintiffs allege exposure to defendants’ asbestos-containing pumps, gaskets, packing and boilers during Navy service.
- Plaintiffs sued multiple manufacturers/suppliers; four defendants (Air & Liquid Systems/ Buffalo Pumps, Goodyear, Foster Wheeler, Crane) moved jointly for summary judgment on causation; plaintiffs later amended complaint and one defendant settled.
- Court assumed for purposes of the motion that defendants’ products contained asbestos and that Sclafani encountered them; the narrow question was whether genuine factual dispute exists that exposure to any particular defendant’s product in reasonable medical probability substantially contributed to his risk of mesothelioma.
- California law (Rutherford) requires (1) threshold exposure and (2) proof by reasonable medical probability, based on competent expert testimony, that exposure to a particular defendant’s product was a substantial factor by contributing to the aggregate dose/risk.
- Plaintiffs’ key expert, Dr. Arnold Brody, opined an “every exposure” theory (any exposure above background contributes). That opinion was previously excluded under Daubert/Fed. R. Evid. 702 as untestable, unpublished, and unsupported by disclosed data.
- Plaintiffs’ epidemiologist (Dr. Horn) offered general statements that any inhaled asbestos fiber increases mesothelioma risk, but his report did not tie exposures to specific defendants and his deposition-only assertions were inadmissible under Rule 26; plaintiffs supplied no non-speculative evidence of frequency, regularity, proximity, or quantification of exposure to any particular defendant’s product.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs have admissible expert evidence establishing that exposure to a particular defendant’s product was, in reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor increasing Sclafani’s risk of mesothelioma | Brody/Horn: ‘‘every exposure’’/any inhaled asbestos increases risk; epidemiology suffices to show contribution to aggregate risk | Defendants: no admissible expert tying specific product exposure to disease; plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions are unreliable, inadmissible, and lack product-specific quantification | Grant: plaintiffs lack admissible, competent expert proof linking any defendant’s product to a substantial increase in risk; summary judgment for defendants granted |
| Whether Rutherford/Hernandez permit admission of an epidemiologist’s general ‘‘every exposure’’ opinion without an M.D. linking product to disease | Plaintiffs rely on Hernandez and Rutherford to argue epidemiologist testimony can satisfy causation without an M.D. stating product-specific causation | Defendants: even if such opinions are sometimes admitted, the experts here (Brody excluded; Horn’s report lacks product-specific opinion) are deficient under Daubert/Rule 26 | Held: Hernandez/Rutherford do not compel admission of Dr. Brody’s opinion; those cases turned on different evidentiary postures and stronger product-exposure proof; here expert opinion excluded or otherwise insufficient |
| Whether plaintiffs’ lay testimony about working on gaskets/pumps creates triable issue on frequency/proximity | Plaintiffs: Sclafani’s deposition describes gasket removal and time spent on tasks, supporting exposure inferences | Defendants: Sclafani’s testimony is too vague/speculative as to how often, how long, and dust generation for any particular defendant’s product | Held: Lay testimony was too speculative about frequency, proximity, and intensity to permit a jury to infer substantial-factor causation |
| Whether deposition-only expert statements can be used when not disclosed in Rule 26 report | Plaintiffs: rely on deposition testimony of Horn to bolster causation | Defendants: such opinions are barred by Rule 37(c)(1)/26 and thus inadmissible | Held: Deposition-only causal assertions are inadmissible; plaintiffs cannot rely on them to defeat summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal.4th 953 (California Supreme Court) (establishes two-part causation test for asbestos cases and reasonable medical probability/aggregate-risk standard)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (U.S. Supreme Court) (expert admissibility standard under Rule 702)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. Supreme Court) (summary judgment burdens and Rule 56 framework)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. Supreme Court) (summary judgment and genuine issue for trial standard)
- Jones v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 163 Cal.App.3d 396 (California Court of Appeal) (cancer etiology beyond lay knowledge; causation requires expert proof)
- Hernandez v. Amcord, Inc., 215 Cal.App.4th 659 (California Court of Appeal) (epidemiologist testimony accepted in different evidentiary posture; does not mandate M.D. testimony)
- Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 184 Cal.App.4th 1078 (California Court of Appeal) (relevant exposure factors: frequency, regularity, proximity)
- R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 673 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir.) (Rule 37(c)(1) prohibits use at trial of information not properly disclosed under Rule 26)