Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC
2016 IL 120041
| Ill. | 2017Background
- Melinda Schweihs defaulted on her mortgage; Chase obtained a foreclosure judgment in May 2010 and had a contractual mortgage clause permitting lender entry to make repairs if borrower defaulted.
- Chase engaged Safeguard to monitor and preserve foreclosed properties; Safeguard subcontracted local vendors (A1 Builders) who used subcontractors (Gonsalez and Centeno) to perform an "initial secure" inspection on Schweihs’s house in June 2010.
- After about 45 minutes of exterior inspection (knocking, neighbor inquiry, observing utilities off, boxes inside, parked vehicle), Gonsalez removed a secondary back-door lock and entered the house; he encountered Schweihs, then left and waited for police when she objected.
- Schweihs alleged fear, medical treatment, therapy, lost sleep, and job issues, and sued for trespass, negligent trespass, private nuisance, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- The trial court dismissed the NIED and IIED claims (and nuisance/IIED on summary judgment), reserved trespass claims; the appellate court affirmed; the Illinois Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the appellate judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a direct victim asserting NIED must allege a contemporaneous physical impact | Schweihs: Cites Corgan and Pasquale — impact requirement abolished for direct victims; NIED need only plead negligence causing emotional injury | Defendants: Illinois law still requires the impact rule for direct victims; Corgan did not abolish it | Held: Impact rule remains required for direct-victim NIED; Schweihs’s NIED count dismissed for failing to allege physical impact |
| Whether language in Pasquale eliminating the impact rule for direct victims is binding | Schweihs: Pasquale’s language confirms elimination of contemporaneous-impact requirement | Defendants: Pasquale mischaracterized Corgan; that language is obiter dictum and not precedential | Held: Pasquale’s statements to that effect are obiter dictum and not binding; courts must read Rickey/Corgan/Pasquale together to retain impact rule for direct victims |
| Whether Gonsalez and Centeno’s entry into Schweihs’s home constituted extreme and outrageous conduct for IIED | Schweihs: Forcible entry into a locked home and taking possession without court order is extreme/outrageous and unjustified | Defendants: Entry was a limited preservation act under contractual lender rights; subcontractors took steps to determine occupancy and left when confronted | Held: Entry and conduct were not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law; summary judgment for defendants on IIED proper |
| Whether foreclosure statutes barred entry absent a court order finding abandonment | Schweihs: Mortgagee needed court order to take possession; statutes restrict possession during redemption | Defendants: Contractual mortgage clause and foreclosure judgment authorized limited entry to preserve property; foreclosure-possession statutes address residential possession, not preservation | Held: Contract and foreclosure judgment permitted preservation entry; statutory arguments did not render the entry extreme or unjustified |
Key Cases Cited
- Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill.2d 546 (adopted zone-of-physical-danger rule for bystander NIED)
- Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill.2d 296 (distinguished bystander/ direct-victim NIED; addressed physical-symptom pleading but did not abolish impact rule)
- Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill.2d 337 (discussed limits of bystander/strict liability emotional-distress recovery; language about Corgan and impact rule held to be dictum)
- Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill.2d 85 (restated requirements for IIED under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46)
- Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73 (early Illinois recognition of IIED tort)
- McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill.2d 78 (articulated modern elements and limits of IIED)