Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC
41 N.E.3d 1011
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- Plaintiff Melinda Schweihs defaulted on a mortgage; Chase obtained judgment of foreclosure in May 2010 but Schweihs remained in the house through the redemption period.
- Safeguard, a preservation company under contract with Chase, received a vendor report indicating the property might be vacant; Safeguard routed an “initial secure” order to A1 Builders, which used subcontractors Gonsalez and Centeno.
- On June 22, 2010, Gonsalez and Centeno investigated the property (checked utilities, spoke with neighbors, observed debris, dumpster, a car) and, with supervisor approval, removed a door lock and entered the house; Schweihs was inside, called her attorney and the police; no arrests.
- Schweihs sued (trespass; negligent trespass; private nuisance; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligence/negligent infliction of emotional distress), defendants moved for summary judgment; trial court granted summary judgment for private nuisance and intentional infliction of emotional distress, allowed amendment on negligence count but dismissed amended negligent infliction claim; trespass claims survived.
- On appeal, Schweihs challenged the summary judgments and the dismissal of her negligent infliction claim; the appellate majority affirmed the trial court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether negligent infliction of emotional distress claim (direct victim) was properly dismissed under 2-615 | Schweihs claimed defendants negligently hired/supervised contractors and negligently executed the initial secure order causing severe emotional harm | Defendants argued Illinois requires either bystander zone-of-danger or physical impact for direct-victim negligent-emotional-distress; complaint lacked alleged physical impact | Dismissal affirmed: plaintiff neither alleged physical contact nor qualified as bystander; direct-victim claim failed as pleaded |
| Whether defendants’ entry constituted extreme and outrageous conduct for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) | Entry during redemption and forcible entry created high probability of severe emotional distress; foreclosure statutes and lack of court order made entry improper | Defendants argued they reasonably investigated occupancy, had contractual/foreclosure-order bases to secure property, and conduct was not beyond all bounds of decency | Summary judgment for defendants on IIED affirmed: no reasonable juror could find conduct extreme/outrageous on these facts |
| Whether one-time entry amounted to private nuisance (substantial, unreasonable invasion of use/enjoyment) | Alleged “unlawful break-in” substantially invaded her use and enjoyment; trespass equates to nuisance | Defendants argued nuisance addresses ongoing, offensive invasions (noise, pollution), not a single entry/trespass | Summary judgment for defendants on nuisance affirmed: single entry/trespass not the type of continuing substantial interference remedyable as private nuisance |
| Whether foreclosure statutes or order barred entry to secure/repair property during redemption | Schweihs argued statutes/foreclosure procedures required court order to take possession or secure property during redemption | Defendants pointed to mortgage clause and foreclosure order authorizing reasonable entry to preserve property; statutes do not absolutely prohibit lender entry to make repairs | Court: foreclosure statutes did not bar entry; mortgage clause and foreclosure order supported lender’s limited right to enter to preserve property |
Key Cases Cited
- Corgan v. Muehling, 143 Ill. 2d 296 (Ill. 1991) (distinguishes bystander zone-of-physical-danger rule from direct-victim negligent-emotional-distress pleading requirements)
- Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 Ill. 2d 546 (Ill. 1983) (adopts zone-of-physical-danger rule for bystander negligent-infliction claims)
- McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78 (Ill. 1988) (elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress; conduct must be extreme and outrageous)
- Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90 (Ill. 1992) (summary-judgment standard — drastic remedy; draw inferences against movant)
- Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337 (Ill. 1995) (discussed in opinion regarding scope of physical-impact requirement but not treated as controlling on Corgan)