2022 IL 126856
Ill.2022Background
- Plaintiff (special administrator for Laurene Schultz) sued St. Clair County, CENCOM 911, the ETSB, and unnamed dispatchers after a 911 dispatcher allegedly refused to dispatch police because plaintiff could not provide an exact address; the decedent later drove off the road and died.
- Claims alleged willful/wanton/reckless refusal to dispatch and failures in training/supervision under the ETS Act and general duties.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under section 2-619, asserting absolute immunity under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act and, alternatively, that the decedent’s conduct was the sole proximate cause.
- The trial court dismissed; the appellate court affirmed, relying on DeSmet to apply section 4-102.
- The Illinois Supreme Court held that section 15.1(a) of the Emergency Telephone System Act provides the relevant (limited) immunity for PSAP employees’ performance or provision of 9-1-1 services, but nevertheless affirmed dismissal because the decedent’s intoxicated driving was the sole proximate cause of her death.
- Justice Garman concurred specially, agreeing dismissal on proximate-cause grounds was dispositive and disagreeing with the majority’s analysis of immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which immunity governs an alleged dispatcher refusal to dispatch when caller lacks an exact address? | Section 15.1(a) of the ETS Act governs PSAP employee conduct in the performance/provision of 9-1-1 service, so limited immunity (gross negligence/recklessness/intentional misconduct exception) applies. | Section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act provides absolute immunity for failures to provide police protection or to dispatch police. | Majority: Section 15.1(a) governs PSAP employees’ performance/provision of 9-1-1 services (limited immunity). |
| Was defendants’ alleged refusal the proximate cause of decedent’s death? | Dispatcher refusal directly prevented police intercept and thus proximately caused death. | Decedent’s intoxicated driving was the sole proximate cause; any dispatcher conduct only furnished a condition. | Held: Decedent’s decision to drive while intoxicated was the sole proximate cause; dismissal affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497 (2006) (interpreting section 4-102 immunity for dispatch-related failures and recognizing section 4-102’s broad reach)
- Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470 (2006) (held a more specific statutory scheme can override Tort Immunity Act when legislature so intends)
- Abruzzo v. City of Park Ridge, 231 Ill. 2d 324 (2008) (applied a statute-specific immunity for emergency medical services over general Tort Immunity Act)
- Thompson v. County of Cook, 154 Ill. 2d 374 (1993) (distinguished between furnishing a condition and actual proximate cause)
- Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959) (abolition of municipal sovereign immunity; historical background for Tort Immunity Act)