Scholastic, Inc. v. David Viley
2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 1207
| Mo. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Employee David Viley slipped on snow/ice in the employer's south parking lot after his 9:00 p.m. shift and injured his right knee, later requiring surgery.
- Viley worked at Scholastic’s Moberly call center; he parked in the south lot "always" and left work across that lot the night of the fall.
- Scholastic leased its facility; the lease granted Scholastic "exclusive use" of the north and south parking lots, though the landlord retained obligations for maintenance.
- Scholastic denied the workers’ compensation claim; the ALJ denied benefits, but the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarded compensation.
- The Commission found (1) Scholastic exercised sufficient control over the south lot to invoke the Act’s extended-premises provision and (2) the hazard (the icy condition of that specific lot) was employment-related under the statute’s equal-exposure test.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the Commission’s findings were supported by competent and substantial evidence and consistent with statutory construction.
Issues
| Issue | Viley's Argument | Scholastic's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the "extended premises" provision applies (control of parking lot) | Lease grants Scholastic exclusive use and Scholastic exercised control (e.g., ejected nonemployees, requested maintenance) so the lot is effectively employer premises | Scholastic did not "control" the lot; it neither owned nor managed the lot and thus cannot be treated as employer premises | Affirmed: "exclusive use" plus demonstrated acts of control suffice to show statutory "control," so the lot is employer extended premises |
| Whether the injury arose out of employment under the equal-exposure test (§ 287.020.3(2)(b)) | The hazard was the icy condition of that particular south lot encountered because of employment; no evidence Viley was exposed to that specific hazard in nonemployment life | Risk of slipping on ice is a common, nonemployment risk to which Viley was equally exposed outside work | Affirmed: focus is on the specific hazard at the specific worksite; Viley was exposed to that hazard by reason of his employment and not shown to be equally exposed in nonemployment life |
Key Cases Cited
- Hager v. Syberg's Westport, 304 S.W.3d 771 (Mo. App. 2010) (defines "control" in extended-premises analysis)
- Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504 (Mo. banc 2012) (directs equal-exposure analysis to the specific risk that caused the injury)
- Miller v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm., 287 S.W.3d 671 (Mo. banc 2009) (unexplained workplace injuries are not compensable merely because they occur at work)
- Duever v. All Outdoors, Inc., 371 S.W.3d 863 (Mo. App. 2012) (slip on ice in employer-related parking lot compensable where exposure was by virtue of employment)
- Dorris v. Stoddard County, 436 S.W.3d 586 (Mo. App. 2014) (hazard identification must be specific to the place and condition causing the injury)
- Wells v. Brown, 33 S.W.3d 190 (Mo. banc 2000) (describes the prior extended-premises doctrine)