Schock, E., Aplt. v. City of Lebanon, 210 A.3d 945

The City of Lebanon proposed a Business Improvement District (a type of Neighborhood Improvement District, "NID") that would assess ongoing fees on certain properties to fund downtown improvements; some properties within the geographic boundary were exempt from assessment.
The preliminary plan identified 358 parcels within the BID boundary; 280 were subject to assessment and 78 were exempt.
The City notified all property owners and lessees, held hearings, and advised that objections from at least 40% of the "benefited property owners" (as described in its cover letter) were required to defeat the BID.
Owners of assessed properties submitted valid objections covering 132 non-exempt parcels (more than 40% of assessed parcels, but less than 40% of all parcels). The City concluded the veto threshold was not met and proceeded.
Plaintiff (Schock), an owner of an assessed parcel, sued for declaratory relief arguing the veto threshold applies to assessed (i.e., fee-bearing or "benefited") properties only; the City argued "affected property owners" in the veto provision encompasses all owners within the NID boundary, including exempt owners.
The Supreme Court reviewed whether "affected property owners" in 73 P.S. § 835(f)(2) refers to all property owners within the NID or only to assessed ("benefited") property owners, and reversed the Commonwealth Court, holding the veto procedure concerns only assessed property owners.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Schock)	Defendant's Argument (City of Lebanon)	Held
Whether "affected property owners" in § 835(f)(2) means only assessed (fee-bearing) owners or all owners within the NID boundary	"Affected" means owners of "benefited properties" (the class referenced in § 835(b)(3)), i.e., those subject to special assessments under the statute	"Affected" should be read by its ordinary, broad meaning (impacted/influenced) to include all property owners within the district, including exempt ones	The Court held "affected property owners" should be read in context as the owners of "benefited properties," and "benefited property" in the Act refers to assessed properties; veto procedure therefore concerns assessed owners only
Whether the statutory definition of "benefited property" (rational nexus) applies only to assessed parcels or also to exempt parcels	"Benefited property" and the statutory rational-nexus test concern only assessed properties (those paying the special assessment)	City argued the presumption of benefit and the assessment ordinance’s scope mean exempt properties may also be considered benefited/affected	The Court held the statutory rational-nexus definition refers to assessed properties; contextual references throughout the Act (assessments, liens, calculation methods) support that interpretation

City of Phila. ex rel. Vulcanite Paving Co. v. Pemberton, 208 Pa. 214, 57 A. 516 (Pa. 1904) (distinguishes special assessments from general taxation and ties validity to special benefit)
PECO Energy Co. v. Commonwealth, 591 Pa. 405, 919 A.2d 188 (Pa. 2007) (presumption that different statutory terms have different meanings)
Oliver v. City of Pittsburgh, 608 Pa. 386, 11 A.3d 960 (Pa. 2011) (appellate review on statutory construction is plenary)
S.O.L. Club, Inc. v. City of Williamsport, 65 Pa. Cmwlth. 351, 443 A.2d 410 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (addressed presumption of benefit in a challenge to an assessment ordinance)
Trust Under Agreement of Taylor, 640 Pa. 629, 164 A.3d 1147 (Pa. 2017) (statutes must be read in context with related provisions)
Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 571 Pa. 580, 812 A.2d 1218 (Pa. 2002) (expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon of construction)