Schneider v. McDaniel
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6724
9th Cir.2012Background
- Schneider was convicted by a Nevada state jury in 1996 of robbery with a deadly weapon, false imprisonment, battery with a deadly weapon, and battery causing substantial bodily harm, for a robbery involving his girlfriend Dehmer and a knife, with Dehmer testifying to Aryan Brotherhood connections.
- Dehmer testified, without objection, about Schneider’s alleged Aryan Brotherhood affiliation; later, Schneider’s counsel moved to strike a heroin-related remark by Dehmer that referenced “Aryan Brotherhood,” which the court struck and admonished the jury to disregard.
- Schneider and Dehmer sought severance; the district court denied severance, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, holding no mistrial was warranted.
- Schneider did not pursue federal relief until 2006 after state post-conviction petitions were denied; he filed a federal habeas petition in 2006, with his First Amended Petition filed in 2007.
- The district court concluded Schneider’s original petition was timely due to equitable tolling based on mental health conditions; it found Grounds 3–6 untimely for not relating back, and Grounds 2 and 7 procedurally defaulted, while Ground 1 was adjudicated on the merits.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, rejecting the relate-back and procedural-default challenges, and declined to grant an evidentiary hearing; Judge Noonan dissented on the tolling/causation issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ground 1 merìts review whether Dawson governs | Schneider argues Dawson applies and trial mistrial denial violated due process | Nevada court distinction between co‑defendant and prosecutorial use may be permissible | Ground 1 affirmed (no due process error) |
| Relation back of Grounds 3–6 to original petition | Grounds share core facts with Ground 1(3) and should relate back | No common core; Mayle controls; separate theories | Grounds 3–6 do not relate back |
| Grounds 2 and 7 procedural default and mental-illness tolling | Mental illness excused default under cause-and-prejudice | Illness tolling differs from cause for default; Hughes/Tacho require absence of complete incapacity | Default not excused; tolling applied to timeliness of original petition, but not to relate-back issues or default analysis |
| Evidentiary hearing expansion of certificate of appealability | Petitioner sought evidentiary hearing on Ground 1 | No substantial showing of entitlement to hearing | Certificate of appealability not expanded; no hearing granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (U.S. 1992) (limits use of abstract beliefs as evidence at sentencing; not controlling on co-defendant testimony)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (U.S. 1993) (harmless-error standard for habeas corpus)
- Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (U.S. 2005) (relation-back doctrine in habeas petitions)
- Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1986) (mental condition as cause for procedural default (pro se petitions))
- Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1988) (analysis of mental condition versus assistance in post-conviction relief)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. 1991) (adequate and independent state ground doctrine in habeas)
- Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2008) (relation-back and related standards in 9th Cir.)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (standard for deference and reasonableness of state court decisions)