Schmidt v. State, 401 P.3d 868

In October 2015, six-year-old D.V. told her school paraprofessional that "my dog licked peanut butter off my butt again," later demonstrating with dolls that her mother’s boyfriend, Bryan Schmidt, put peanut butter on her vaginal area and the family dog licked (and once bit) it.
School counselor and paraprofessional brought D.V. to school nurse Sabra Hoffman; D.V. repeated the report, selected SunButter (peanut-butter substitute) to identify the substance, drew and physically demonstrated the alleged acts.
School staff reported to the principal, who alerted DFS and law enforcement; subsequent investigation recovered peanut-butter–consistent residue and other corroborating physical evidence; medical exam showed a puncture wound to D.V.’s labia majora.
D.V. was later adjudicated incompetent to testify at trial; the State sought to admit D.V.’s out-of-court statements through the school nurse under W.R.E. 803(4) (medical-diagnosis/treatment exception); the district court admitted only the nurse’s testimony under Rule 803(4).
Bryan Schmidt was convicted by a jury of sexual exploitation of a child and two counts of sexual abuse; he appealed, arguing (1) Rule 803(4) foundation was lacking and (2) admission violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights because D.V. was unavailable and had not been cross-examined.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Schmidt)	Held
Whether D.V.’s statements to the school nurse were admissible under W.R.E. 803(4) (statements for medical diagnosis/treatment)	Nurse’s involvement was for assessing D.V.’s wellbeing, potential injury, need for medical care and protective custody; statements were relied on for diagnosis/treatment of child abuse	Statements lacked foundation: no physical exam or treatment by nurse, D.V. not in pain, many questions asked by paraprofessional, role-play/game undermined reliability, and competency finding casts doubt on trustworthiness	Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion — statements to school nurse met Rule 803(4) foundation because nurse’s purpose was diagnosis/treatment (including protection) and she relied on statements in assessing need for care/protection
Whether admission of the nurse’s testimony violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause because D.V. was unavailable and not cross-examined	Statements were non-testimonial — made spontaneously in informal school setting to persons concerned with child’s safety and treatment, not to create prosecutorial evidence	Admission denied confrontation right because defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant	Affirmed: statements were non-testimonial under Ohio v. Clark factors (primary purpose to protect/treat child), so no Crawford violation

McLaury v. State, 305 P.3d 1144 (Wyo. 2013) (explains reliability rationale for Rule 803(4) and foundation requirements)
Oldman v. State, 998 P.2d 957 (Wyo. 2000) (recognizes prevention of further abuse as part of treatment for Rule 803(4) purposes)
Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983) (endorses liberal application of Rule 803(4) in child-abuse cases)
Bruce v. State, 346 P.3d 909 (Wyo. 2015) (frames Confrontation Clause analysis per Crawford and Davis)
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015) (Supreme Court factor-based test for whether statements to non-law-enforcement actors are testimonial)
Griggs v. State, 367 P.3d 1108 (Wyo. 2016) (two-part test for foundation under Rule 803(4))
Szymanski v. State, 166 P.3d 879 (Wyo. 2007) (standard for reviewing evidentiary rulings)