Schmid v. Simmons, 970 N.W.2d 735

In 2014 Lanny Schmid, Lee Simmons, and Thomas Masters became members of MAR14, LLC, which held the “Canyon Rim” tract; Schmid transferred $600,000 into an account controlled by Simmons the day the land closed. The parties disputed whether that transfer was a capital contribution to MAR14 or a separate investment.
Schmid sued Simmons, MAR14, and Niobrara River Ranch (NRR) seeking accounting, declaratory relief (membership percentages), quiet title to a parcel, and judicial dissolution; defendants counterclaimed (including breach of contract/estoppel, resulting trust, and quiet title).
At a February 2017 progression conference the parties agreed the matter was equitable and would be tried to the court; later Simmons/NRR amended to add a breach-of-contract counterclaim and demanded a jury trial, which the district court struck under the equitable cleanup doctrine.
A 4-day bench trial followed. The court found Schmid intended his $600,000 for the Canyon Rim purchase, declared him owner of a 53.57% undivided interest, ordered an accounting and conveyance, recognized a resulting trust for some parties, denied most legal counterclaims, and declined to dissolve MAR14.
MAR14 later asked (first in closing/posttrial brief) that Schmid be dissociated; the district court refused to rule in MAR14’s favor on dissociation and denied MAR14’s motion to alter or amend. Simmons and NRR appealed the jury-trial ruling; MAR14 cross-appealed the refusal to dissociate Schmid.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Schmid)	Defendant's Argument (Simmons / NRR / MAR14)	Held
Whether defendants were entitled to a jury trial on legal counterclaims	Case is primarily equitable; bench trial appropriate	Defendants argued their breach-of-contract/assumpsit counterclaims entitled them to a jury	Court: No jury as main object was equitable; equitable cleanup doctrine permits bench resolution of legal claims in that context
Whether Jacobson v. Shresta abrogated the equitable cleanup doctrine	Equitable cleanup remains valid and applicable	Defendants argued Jacobson effectively abrogated or limited the doctrine	Court: Jacobson only clarified valid jury-waiver methods; it did not abrogate equitable cleanup
Whether equitable cleanup doctrine is unconstitutional or should be abandoned	Doctrine consistent with Neb. Const. art. I, § 6 and common-law preservation of jury right	Defendants argued doctrine is outdated/unconstitutional and should be abandoned	Court: Doctrine constitutional and still serves efficiency purposes; decline to abandon it
Whether the court erred by not dissociating Schmid from MAR14	MAR14: dissociation was pleaded or tried by consent and § 21-147(b) authorizes alternative remedies to dissolution	Schmid: dissociation not pleaded or tried; issue first raised in closing/posttrial; court discretionary under § 21-147(b)	Court: No abuse of discretion—dissociation was not plead or tried by consent; § 21-147(b) discretionary and court did not err

Kuhlman v. Cargile, 200 Neb. 150, 262 N.W.2d 454 (Neb. 1978) (articulates and applies the equitable cleanup doctrine permitting equity courts to resolve legal claims when equitable jurisdiction is properly acquired)
Jacobson v. Shresta, 288 Neb. 615, 849 N.W.2d 515 (Neb. 2014) (clarifies statutory methods that create a valid waiver of jury trial; does not eliminate equitable cleanup)
State ex rel. Cherry v. Burns, 258 Neb. 216, 602 N.W.2d 477 (Neb. 1999) (explains distinction between actions at law and in equity for jury-right analysis)
Krumm v. Pillard, 104 Neb. 335, 177 N.W. 171 (Neb. 1920) (historical discussion that a jury right does not apply in purely equitable proceedings)