Schmid v. Simmons, 311 Neb. 48

In 2014 Schmid, Simmons, and others bought 560 acres including the “Canyon Rim” tract; title was held in MAR14, LLC, whose members were Simmons, Schmid, and Masters.
Schmid transferred $600,000 to an account controlled by Simmons at closing; parties disputed whether that was a MAR14 capital contribution or a separate investment, leading to claims and requests for an accounting.
Schmid sued MAR14, Simmons, and NRR seeking quiet title to part of the Canyon Rim parcel, a declaratory judgment on membership/ownership percentages, an accounting, and judicial dissolution.
Simmons/NRR counterclaimed (including a breach-of-contract/estoppel claim) and demanded a jury; at a 2017 progression conference the parties agreed the matter was equitable and would be tried to the court, but Simmons/NRR later added a jury demand which the district court struck under the equitable cleanup doctrine.
After a 4-day bench trial the district court ordered an accounting, declared Schmid owner of a 53.57% undivided interest in the Canyon Rim land and a resulting trust, denied most other relief, and found Schmid was not a financial member of MAR14.
Simmons/NRR appealed arguing they were entitled to a jury on legal counterclaims and that the equitable-cleanup doctrine should not apply; MAR14 cross-appealed arguing the court should have dissociated Schmid as a member under §21-147(b).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Schmid)	Defendant's Argument (Simmons/NRR or MAR14)	Held
1) Entitlement to jury on defendants’ legal counterclaims	Action is primarily equitable; equitable-cleanup bars a jury on incidental legal claims	Defendants entitled to jury as to legal counterclaims (breach of contract/estoppel)	Court held action’s main object was equitable; equitable-cleanup applies and defendants had no right to a jury
2) Whether Jacobson v. Shresta abrogated equitable-cleanup	Jacobson only limits waiver doctrine; it did not abrogate equitable-cleanup	Jacobson abrogated or undermined cleanup doctrine	Court held Jacobson addresses jury waiver rules only and did not abrogate equitable-cleanup
3) Whether equitable-cleanup is unconstitutional or should be abandoned	Doctrine is constitutional and promotes efficiency; should be retained	Doctrine is antiquated/unconstitutional and should be abandoned	Court held doctrine is consistent with Neb. Const. art. I, § 6 (historic common-law rule) and affirmed its continued applicability
4) MAR14 cross-appeal: dissociation of Schmid	MAR14: court should have dissociated Schmid (argues pleaded, tried by consent, and statutory authority under §21-147(b))	Schmid: dissociation not pleaded, not tried by consent, and court had discretion not to order dissociation	Court found dissociation was not pled or tried by consent; §21-147(b) affords discretion and the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to dissociate Schmid

Kuhlman v. Cargile, 200 Neb. 150, 262 N.W.2d 454 (1978) (articulates equitable-cleanup doctrine allowing equity court to decide related legal claims)
Jacobson v. Shresta, 288 Neb. 615, 849 N.W.2d 515 (2014) (clarifies standards for finding waiver of jury trial under statutory §25-1126)
State ex rel. Cherry v. Burns, 258 Neb. 216, 602 N.W.2d 477 (1999) (discusses distinction between actions at law and in equity for jury-right purposes)
Sechovec v. Harms, 187 Neb. 70, 187 N.W.2d 296 (1971) (equity courts may grant complete relief—legal or equitable—to avoid multiple suits)
Krumm v. Pillard, 104 Neb. 335, 177 N.W. 171 (1920) (historical common-law principle that jury trial is not a matter of right in equitable proceedings)