Schlumberger Limited and Schlumberger Technology Corporation v. Charlotte Rutherford
01-14-00776-CV
| Tex. App. | Mar 13, 2015Background
- Charlotte Rutherford, a former Schlumberger IP attorney, moved to dismiss Schlumberger’s suit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA); Schlumberger opposed and the trial court denied dismissal as to a breach-of-contract claim.
- Schlumberger sued after a related federal patent-infringement suit was filed; Rutherford contends Schlumberger’s claims were retaliatory and meant to damage her reputation and derail the patent case.
- Central factual dispute: Schlumberger alleges Rutherford deleted files from a company laptop and failed to return USB/external drives containing confidential information; Rutherford disputes that deletions caused loss, that the drives belonged to Schlumberger or contained trade secrets, and produced a forensic image of at least one drive showing only personal photos.
- Legal focal point: whether Rutherford’s actions fall within TCPA-protected petitioning/association/free-speech conduct, and whether Schlumberger presented “clear and specific evidence” of each element of breach of contract to overcome a TCPA dismissal.
- Rutherford’s brief argues the TCPA’s statutory text covers private communications and broad petition/association activity; she contends Schlumberger’s evidence is circumstantial and insufficient to meet the TCPA’s clear-and-specific-evidence standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Rutherford) | Defendant's Argument (Schlumberger) | Held / Position in Brief & Authorities |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the TCPA protect private (non-public) communications involving petition/association? | TCPA text defines "communication" broadly and does not limit protection to public settings; private communications can be protected. | TCPA should be read to protect petition/association only when communications are public or tied to public matters. | Rutherford: statutory definitions control; Better Bus. supports broad coverage. Whisenhunt and some federal decisions addressed only free-speech prong and are distinguishable. |
| Must TCPA protection require a nexus to participation in government or public concern? | No; statute’s definitions of petition and association are broader than constitutional First Amendment limits and need not be tied to government participation. | Yes; TCPA purpose statement indicates focus on participation in government/public matters. | Rutherford relies on this Court’s Better Bus. Bureau holding rejecting a strict nexus requirement; Cheniere’s discussion is dicta and concerned pleading sufficiency, not scope. |
| Does Rutherford’s conduct fall outside the commercial-activity exception (section 27.010)? | Communications at issue are not arising out of sale/lease of goods/services and were directed to employer or federal court, not marketplace; exception inapplicable. | Schlumberger contends commercial-activity exception removes TCPA protection. | Rutherford: exception inapplicable based on intent/audience; cites Schimmel for similar reasoning. |
| Did Schlumberger present "clear and specific evidence" of each element of breach of contract to defeat TCPA dismissal? | No — evidence is circumstantial, admits alternative explanations (backups, legitimate transfers, personal files), lacks proof drives belonged to Schlumberger or contained trade secrets, and contains contradictory witness statements. | Yes — alleged deletions, missing drives, and witness statements establish breach and entitlement to monetary damages or specific performance. | Rutherford: trial record lacks clear and specific evidence; inferences are stacked and competing explanations negate the required showing; she asks this Court to reverse denial of dismissal as to contract claim. Trial court denied dismissal; Rutherford seeks reversal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. John Moore Servs., Inc., 441 S.W.3d 345 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013) (interpreting TCPA’s text strictly and rejecting a narrow nexus-to-government limitation)
- Cheniere Energy, Inc. v. Lotfi, 449 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (discussing pleading/evidentiary sufficiency under TCPA; statement about nexus treated as dicta here)
- Whisenhunt v. Lippincott, 416 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013) (addressing free-speech prong and public-concern limitation; distinguished by Rutherford)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (court warns against stacking inferences and treating competing inferences as evidence)
- i4i Ltd. P’Ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (patent litigation implicates public interest — used to support that patent matters can be "public concern")
- Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (U.S. 1987) (private workplace speech can be constitutionally protected; cited to rebut the claim that private communications are never protected)