Schlittler, David, PD-1505-14

Background

Defendant David Schlittler was serving a prison sentence for aggravated sexual assault of a child (his step‑daughter B.M.).
The victim B.M. and the purportedly contacted child B.S. are half‑siblings; B.S. is Schlittler’s biological son and was 13 at the time.
A family‑court order (2007) expressly barred Schlittler from any contact with B.S. while Schlittler was incarcerated; the mother did not consent to contact.
While in prison Schlittler sent messages through a third party (Bonita/Bonita Ralston) to B.S., urging B.S. to pressure B.M. to recant her allegations.
Schlittler was indicted under Texas Penal Code § 38.111 (contact by incarcerated persons with victims or victims’ family when the victim was under 17 and no written consent was on file).
Trial court denied Schlittler’s facial and as‑applied constitutional challenges (Due Process and Equal Protection); the State argues § 38.111 is constitutional and, in any event, Schlittler had already been deprived of the contact right by the family‑court order.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Schlittler)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether § 38.111, as applied, violates Due Process by infringing a fundamental parental right to communicate/parent from prison	Schlittler contends he retains a fundamental right to communicate with and parent his son and § 38.111 unjustifiably infringes that right	State argues Schlittler had already been deprived of the contact/parenting right by prior family‑court order; § 38.111 is narrowly tailored to protect minor victims and applies only after conviction for listed offenses	Court upheld § 38.111 as not violating Due Process (statute narrowly tailored; compelling state interest in protecting minors); plus State emphasizes Schlittler lacked the right at time of offense
Whether § 38.111 violates Equal Protection by targeting sex‑offender prisoners and not others	Schlittler argues the statute discriminates against sex‑offender prisoners and infringes parental rights without adequate tailoring	State contends convicted sex offenders are not a suspect class; the law targets communications with young victims to serve a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored	Court rejected Equal Protection challenge: strict scrutiny satisfied (compelling interest protecting children; statute limited to victims under 17 and prisoners convicted of listed offenses)

Key Cases Cited

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (as‑applied invalidity doctrine where statute deprives individual of protected right)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parental right to care, custody, and control of children is a fundamental liberty interest)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (standard of proof in parental‑rights termination proceedings; clear and convincing evidence requirement)
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (Due Process limits on state removal of children without showing of parental unfitness)
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (framework for identifying fundamental rights under Due Process)
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (compelling state interest in protecting children can justify regulation in sensitive constitutional areas)
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (state interest in protecting children in criminal law contexts)
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (balancing defendant rights and child psychological well‑being)
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (narrow tailoring requirement in content‑based restrictions)
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (recognition of compelling interests in protecting children)
Villareal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Crim. App.) (no constitutional violation when the asserted protected interest is already removed)
Cannady v. State, 11 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. Crim. App.) (analysis re: suspect classes and Equal Protection)
Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Crim. App.) (criminal defendants not a suspect class)
Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim. App.) (recognizing state's interest in protecting children)
Barker v. State, 335 S.W.3d 731 (Tex. App.) (convicted sex offenders not a suspect class)