Schlittler, David, PD-1505-14

Appellant David Schlittler was convicted under Texas Penal Code §38.111 for contacting his minor son while incarcerated after a modified SAPCR order had limited his visitation to supervised sessions.
The SAPCR court had awarded supervised visitation every 1st, 3rd, and 5th Saturday for two hours; that order remained in effect after Schlittler’s 2008 criminal sentence for sexual assault of his former step-daughter.
Schlittler was accused of violating §38.111 by contacting his son in September 2008; the prosecution rested on subsection (a)(2), which criminalizes an incarcerated person’s contact with a child if a person with legal authority (here, the mother/ex-wife) withholds consent.
Schlittler contends the statute, as applied, infringed his fundamental parental liberty because there was no judicial finding that he was unfit as to his son or that contact would endanger the child’s health or safety.
He also argues subsection (a)(2) effects an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power by granting his ex-wife veto authority to criminalize his parental contact without meaningful governmental review or standards.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Schlittler)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether §38.111, as applied, infringes fundamental parental liberty by criminalizing parental contact	Statute criminalized exercise of parental rights despite absence of judicial finding of unfitness or danger; strict scrutiny required	State contends modified conservatorship and conviction justify restriction and the statute serves compelling safety interests	Lower courts upheld conviction/statute application; appellant asks this Court to find §38.111 unconstitutional as applied and reverse (Court of Criminal Appeals granted review)
Whether subsection (a)(2) impermissibly delegates legislative power to a private party (ex-wife)	Subsection (a)(2) gives private veto power without review, representation, standards, or qualifications — fails Boll Weevil factors	State argues delegation is narrowly tailored to protect victim and sibling and is constitutional	Appellant argues delegation fails the Proctor/Boll Weevil test and renders the statute invalid as applied; lower courts treated (a)(2) as narrowing statute (issue remains for this Court)

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (due-process standard for involuntary termination of parental rights)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (U.S. 2000) (parental fundamental rights and judicial deference in third-party visitation disputes)
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (U.S. 1972) (parental rights against state interference where compelling interests must be shown)
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1976) (invalidating statutory grant of private veto over constitutional right)
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (U.S. 1992) (limits on delegating veto authority over fundamental rights)
Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1998) (announcing the Boll Weevil factors for private delegations of public power)
Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. 1997) (delegation scrutiny and standards for private entities performing public functions)
Stockton v. Offenbach, 336 S.W.3d 610 (Tex. 2011) (de novo review for constitutional challenges to statutes)