Schlittler, David, PD-1505-14

David Schlittler, incarcerated for aggravated sexual assault of his former step-daughter, was charged under Tex. Penal Code § 38.111 for contacting a victim’s family member (his biological son) while in custody.
A modified conservatorship (SAPCR) order restricted Schlittler’s contact with his son; mother did not consent to the post-order contacts and reported them to police and prison officials.
Schlittler sent messages to his son through a third party urging the son to convince the half‑sister to recant.
Trial court denied Schlittler’s pretrial and renewed as-applied constitutional challenges to § 38.111; a jury convicted and sentenced him to eight years.
The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed; Schlittler sought discretionary review to argue § 38.111 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses as applied to him.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 38.111, as applied, violates substantive due process by infringing parental liberty	Schlittler: statute broadly and absolutely bars contact with his son (who was not the sexual‑assault victim), impairing a fundamental parental right; state cannot show a compelling, narrowly tailored interest	State: protecting victims and their families from further trauma is a compelling interest that justifies the prohibition	Twelfth Court of Appeals: statute did not violate due process (affirmed); appellant urges this Court to reverse (appellate posture)
Whether § 38.111, as applied, violates equal protection by singling out sex‑offense classes and abridging parental rights	Schlittler: statute creates a class (certain sexual offenders) that substantially interferes with a fundamental right and is not narrowly tailored; disparate treatment of non‑sexual violent offenders is arbitrary	State: classification is by offense type (sex offenses) and uniformly applied to protect particularly sensitive victims and families	Twelfth Court of Appeals: statute treated class members equally and survived review (affirmed); appellant contends strict scrutiny should apply and statute fails

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parental right to make child‑rearing decisions is a fundamental liberty interest)
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulations restricting rights upheld if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests)
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (prison visitation restrictions upheld where reasonably related to safety and rehabilitation)
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (incarceration does not extinguish all constitutional protections; restraints subject to legitimate penological justification)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental rights are fundamental and require heightened procedural safeguards)
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (laws affecting fundamental procreative/family rights trigger strict scrutiny)
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (courts must avoid irrebuttable presumptions that infringe fundamental rights)
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (censorship of prisoner mail permissible in certain circumstances; protections apply to prisoner communications)
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (prison regulations on publications/restrictions reviewed for reasonable relation to penological interests)
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (prison racial‑classification policies require careful review; Turner remains controlling for many prison restrictions)