723 F.3d 396
2d Cir.2013Background
- Plaintiffs Lori Schlessinger and Brenda Pianko bought furniture protection plans (the "Plan") issued by Valspar; the Plan promised repair or replacement for covered damage.
- The Plan included a "store closure provision" that, if the purchasing store closed, limited Valspar's obligation to refund the Plan purchase price rather than continue service.
- Fortunoff (the retailer) later went bankrupt; Valspar refunded Pianko the Plan purchase price and declined to perform repairs, while Schlessinger made no claim.
- Plaintiffs contended the store-closure clause violated N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 395-a, which restricts termination of maintenance agreements and grants enforcement to government officials.
- Plaintiffs sued for (1) breach of contract, arguing the offending clause should be void as against public policy, and (2) statutory consumer-fraud under GBL § 349, alleging deception by selling and enforcing a clause that violates § 395-a.
- The District Court dismissed both claims; the Second Circuit certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals, which answered both in the negative, leading the Second Circuit to affirm dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a contract clause that contradicts GBL § 395-a be declared void as against public policy? | The store-closure clause violates § 395-a and should be severed/voided, leaving Valspar liable for breach when it refused service. | § 395-a contains no private right of action and does not expressly invalidate inconsistent contract terms; enforcement is for government officials. | No. Parties may not seek to void contract provisions on that basis; no private cause of action exists to enforce § 395-a. |
| May plaintiffs proceed under GBL § 349 alleging deception because defendant sold a Plan containing a clause that violates § 395-a and later enforced it? | Selling and later enforcing a clause that violates § 395-a is deceptive and actionable under § 349. | Violations of § 395-a alone are not inherently deceptive; § 349 is reserved for practices that tend to deceive consumers, not all statutory violations enforced only by the Attorney General. | No. Violation of § 395-a, standing alone, is too attenuated to constitute a § 349 deceptive practice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schlessinger v. Valspar Corp., 686 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (prior appellate opinion, certification to NY Court of Appeals)
- Schlessinger v. Valspar Corp., 817 F. Supp. 2d 100 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (district-court dismissal of plaintiffs' claims)
- Kerusa Co. LLC v. W10Z/515 Real Estate Ltd. P’ship, 906 N.E.2d 1049 (N.Y. 2009) (courts should not create backdoor private causes of action to enforce statutes that confer enforcement on public officials)
