Schilling v. Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development, 662 F. App'x 243

Judy Schilling, a DOTD employee, is undisputedly disabled under the ADA and requested multiple workplace accommodations (handicapped parking, an office door, permission to wear slipper-like shoes).
DOTD made accommodations at various times: converted a distant handicapped spot in 2007, provided a rear spot in 2009, gave interim permissions on footwear in 2008, and installed an office door in March 2011; Schilling contends some accommodations were unreasonably delayed or incomplete.
Schilling was terminated in May 2012 after exhausting FMLA leave, filed an EEOC charge, then sued DOTD in state court for failure to accommodate and hostile work environment/retaliation; DOTD removed the case to federal court.
Before trial, Schilling proposed jury instructions emphasizing that employer delay in the interactive process (and delay alone) can constitute an ADA violation; the district court refused those instructions as not grounded in Fifth Circuit precedent and as duplicative.
After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for DOTD; Schilling moved for a new trial arguing the court erred by refusing her delay-related instructions, which the district court denied.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding the proposed delay instruction was not a substantially correct statement of Fifth Circuit law and that the court’s given instructions and parties’ trial arguments adequately covered the issue.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a jury instruction stating that delay alone may give rise to ADA liability should be given	Schilling: Delay in accommodating (even if accommodation provided later) can constitute an ADA violation and jury should be instructed accordingly	DOTD: No Fifth Circuit precedent requires such an instruction; it rests on out-of-circuit authority and EEOC guidance	Court: Refused to adopt instruction; not a substantially correct statement of Fifth Circuit law and not required; affirmed denial of new trial
Whether exclusion of the proposed delay instruction seriously impaired plaintiff's trial presentation	Schilling: Exclusion deprived jury guidance and impaired her ability to prove liability based on delay	DOTD: Schilling could fully argue delay and bad faith through evidence and counsel argument; instruction unnecessary	Court: No impairment—Schilling argued delay repeatedly and given instructions on good-faith interactive process sufficiently covered the claim

Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2004) (standard for reviewing refusal to give a requested jury instruction)
Chevron Phillips Chem. Co. v. EEOC, 570 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2009) (employer must engage in meaningful interactive process)
Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731 (5th Cir. 1999) (suggests delay might create liability but employer need not move at maximum speed)
Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996) (delay in interactive process can indicate lack of good faith)
Valle-Arce v. P.R. Ports Auth., 651 F.3d 190 (1st Cir. 2011) (unreasonable delay may amount to failure to provide reasonable accommodation)
Ratliff v. City of Gainesville, 256 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2001) (district court not required to give jury instructions not grounded in circuit precedent)
United States v. McClatchy, 249 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2001) (principles on jury instruction review)